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INTRODUCTION
The Internet provides a level playing field for small companies to
1
compete with their largest global competitors. This potential is
2
particularly true for companies in Latin America that see the
Internet as the means to expand business opportunities across
borders in both the business-to-business (“B2B”) and business-to3
consumer (“B2C”) sectors. Business indicators show that Latin
4
America, with a population of 435.5 million people rich in language
and diverse culture, represents an imposing emerging market of vast
opportunity where growing international computer access and
5
increasing consumerism are rapidly converging and propagating.
Yet, the rush by international companies and Latin American startups to establish electronic commerce in the region is not without
serious pitfalls and obstacles, and growth in this new business frontier
has been tempered by Latin America’s traditional lumbering
government control, archaic laws, institutionalized corruption, and
persistent underdevelopment.
The focus of this article is to identify and discuss the various
business and legal challenges investors, entrepreneurs, and
established companies must confront and overcome if e-commerce is
to take hold throughout the Americas, and examine some of the
progress being made. As we will see, there is unlimited potential in
the Latin American market if the most stubborn details can be

1. See Onelia Collazo, E-tailing, LATINFINANCE, June 1999, at 48 (describing the
Internet’s impact on international commerce as having leveled the playing field
between large and small firms).
2. Collectively, Latin America comprises the following nineteen countries:
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto
See
Rico,
Trinidad
and
Tobago,
Uruguay,
and
Venezuela.
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CONTRIBUTION OF THE PACKAGED SOFTWARE INDUSTRY TO
THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIES 46 (1999) (study commissioned by the Business
Software Alliance).
3. According to Lycos CEO Bob Davis, “Latin America is poised to become the
next great growth center for Internet services.” Robert Conlin, Lycos Targets Latin
Markets on Two Continents, E-COMMERCE TIMES, Oct. 19, 1999, at
http://www.ecommercetimes.com/news/articles/991019-7.shtml.
4. Almost 170 million people (169.8 million), or 39% of Latin Americans reside
in Brazil. See eMarketer, THE EGLOBAL REPORT, July 1999, at 172 [hereinafter
“eMarketer July 1999”].
5. The following analysts have independently forecasted tremendous growth
(albeit in varying degrees) in the Latin American market via reports issued in the
press and in industry studies and newsletters: Lehman Brothers, Boston Consulting
Group, eMarketer, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Forrester Research, Gartner Group,
Jupiter Communications, and International Data Corporation (IDC).
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resolved favorably.
The most pressing challenges and obstacles to e-commerce in Latin
America include:
• Overcoming unique cultural and socio-economic legacies
• Cultural peculiarities in consumer habits and customs
• Access limited by poor economic conditions and uncertainty
• Expensive and unreliable telecommunications systems
• Underdeveloped distribution and delivery systems as a barrier to ecommerce
• Cumbersome customs procedures and taxation
• Lack of laws and regulations to stabilize and secure e-commerce
• The elements favorable for pursuing e-commerce in Latin America,
however, make the challenges well-worth surmounting. These
include:
• A growing consumer market, particularly for imported items
• Advances in security for online transactions
• Regional Internet providers and portals benefiting from significant
foreign investment capital
• A rising middle class that is becoming more computer literate,
online savvy, and materialistic
• Updated and restructured telecommunications systems across
Latin America
• Established .com companies (Terra Networks Group, Yahoo!, and
Microsoft) moving aggressively into Latin American markets in
anticipation of market stabilization.
I.

OVERVIEW OF THE TERRAIN

Latin America is emerging from the centuries-old colonial
6
mercantile and agrarian-based economies endemic to the region.
The last two decades have seen the traditional political structure of
7
absolute control give ground to a new generation of young,
entrepreneurial technocrats and businessmen, trained overseas,
indoctrinated in global capitalism, and eager to utilize the vast

6. “In general, economic policies during colonial eras were characterized by
heavy mercantilist trade with the colonizers.” Mark Baker, Privatization in the
Developing World: Panacea for the Economic Ills of the Third World or Prescription Overused?,
18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 233, 245 (1999). See also Linda Newson, The Latin
American Colonial Experience, in LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT: GEOGRAPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES 7 (David Preston ed., 1987).
7. See Saladin Al-Jurf, Good Governance and Transparency: Their Impact on
Development, 9 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193, 198 (1999) (emphasizing the
traditional, culturally-embedded notion that Latin American governments should
have absolute authority in political, social, and economic affairs).
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8

natural and human resources of the region. No longer content
merely to follow the old model of centralized and closed business
practices, they have aggressively embraced the Internet and other
9
information technologies to compete in the global marketplace.
10
This “young, wealthy, mobile professional class” clashes with the
“old guard” of the professional elite, which remains reluctant to
reform and fearful of adapting to a free market economy, technology
11
and the seemingly unfathomable potential of the Internet. Most
Latin American countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, are
blessed with a well-educated and growing middle class, which, when
combined with a relatively cheap skilled labor force, leaves the region
poised to enter an era of unprecedented new prosperity.
But the nations in the region are not without significant contrasts.
Argentina, for instance, has shown exceptional initiative, as
Argentinians tend to be more open-minded and know how to
12
promote themselves.
On the other hand, Brazil, although
possessing more money and a larger population than Argentina, has
been slow in achieving supremacy in the .com industry because the
size of the country and an isolating language barrier have kept
13
Brazilians from looking beyond their nation’s borders. At least for
now, even though these countries are not exactly the exception to the

8. For substantial portraits of some of the players in e-commerce, see ¿Qué
significa la vida en la Internet? REVISTA LATIN TRADE, June 2000, at 64. See also Albert
Fishlow, Leaving History Behind in Latin America, NEW PERSP. Q., Sept. 22, 1993, at 16;
Las 50 Caras en América Latina de Internet, I-BIZ: NEGOCIOS EN RED, vol. 1, Apr. 2000, at
25.
9. See generally Thomas Weyr, Latin Dot-com Markets: Ups and Downs, DM NEWS,
June 12, 2000, supp. at 18; Rebecca Winters, Joining the Rush to Cash In, TIME, Int’l
Ed., Apr. 3, 2000, at 46 (discussing the impact on the Latin American business world
of young entrepreneurs using the Internet); and Punto.com Inc. Launches Monthly
Magazine, Suite of Online Services Covering Latin America’s Internet Economy, BUS. WIRE,
July 24, 2000 (quoting Esteban Piedrahita, chief executvie office of Punto.com as
saying, “The Internet is revolutionizing the business world in Latin America, and we
are offering a roadmap to that revolution . . . by offering comprehensive, panregional intelligence on the Latin American economy, we are empowering a new
generation of Latin American entrepreneurs.”).
10. Internet 1: Brick and Mortar 0- Latin American Banks are Losing Their Best
Customers to On-line Competitors, INFOAMERICAS, Apr.-May 2000 [hereinafter Latin
American Banks], at http://www.infoamericas.com/Tendencias/General/0400/
0400_industry_forecast.htm.
11. See id. (maintaining that industry leaders have failed to progress due to the
arrogance of command-control management, their benightedness about the power
of the Internet, and inattention to the needs of their clients).
12. According to Gerardo Waisburg, “there is need for strong ego and strong
persuasion, because one has to convert non-believers into believers. [What is needed
is] a very successful personality that produces a fate of fulfill[ed] prophesy.” See
Rodrigo Lara Serrano, Muzo: Hay in Argentin en Misopa, I.BIZ, Apr. 2000, at 53.
13. See id. at 54. Apparently, language is Brazil’s biggest obstacle. There are
more than 388 million Spanish-speakers in the world. Portuguese is only spoken in
Portugal, Brazil, and Macao.
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rule, much of Latin America is still struggling to redefine political
and economic realities and set new courses for the future. Colombia,
for instance, has maintained a strong industrial economy and skilled
labor force for generations. Yet, political instability and internal
turmoil, drug trafficking and uncontrolled criminality, and
institutionalized corruption as high art, have prevented Colombians
14
from moving more quickly into the new technology economy.
Colombia is not alone in this respect, and such strife and uncertainty
have made Internet and technology investors wary about moving too
quickly into a region still struggling to sort out its longstanding and
perplexing problems.
Recent political and economic events
elsewhere in the region have tempered the eagerness of investors to
jump into the fray. Ecuador has just taken the unusual step of
establishing the U.S. dollar as the nation’s official currency, hoping
15
to lower an inflation rate of around 104% per year.
Although
Ecuador joins ten other nations using the U.S. dollar as the official
currency, the move has caused significant upheaval in the retail
sector where, due to the lack of coins in U.S. currency, merchants are
“rounding off prices at the dollar level—a sore point in a poor
country where more than two-thirds of workers earn less than $30 a
16
month.” In Venezuela, the populist Chavez government continues
to scare foreign investors with threats to radically reform the banking,
financial, and regulatory infrastructure in the name of rooting out
17
corruption.
Having said this, however, the demographics in Latin America are
encouraging for the growing Internet market. Since the majority of
online computer users are wealthy young professionals, one Internet
analysis group, InfoAmericas, “estimates that there are about 10
million bankable customers across Latin America in the twenty to
thirty-nine age group, who consume an average of $50,000 per year,
18
of their own money or that of their parents.” This group of Latin

14. See generally DAVID BUSHNELL, THE MAKING OF MODERN COLOMBIA: A NATION
SPITE OF ITSELF (1993) (detailing how societal ills have hindered the
modernization of Columbia).
15. See Ecuador Makes Switch to U.S. Currency, Has Trouble Making Change (Sept. 11,
2000), available at http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/americas/09/11/ecuador.
dollars.ap/ (commenting on public officials’ hope that the currency switch will
decrease the highest annual inflation rate of all Latin American countries).
16. Id. Other Latin American countries moving closer to full adoption of the
U.S. dollar are Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. Panama has used U.S.
currency since 1902. See Will Weissert, Guatemala Close to Dollarization, available at
http://www.imadr.org/project/guatemala/news3.html (visited Apr. 30, 2001).
17. See Juan O. Tamayo, By Mingling Military and Politics, Is Chavez Eroding
Democracy in Venezuela?, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 1, 1999.
18. Latin American Banks, supra note 10.

IN

NAGLEPP.DOC

864

10/10/2001 11:04 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:859
19

American elites surfs online an average of eight hours per week. It
is expected that the number of Internet users in Latin America will
climb from less than twenty million at present to more than seventy20
seven million by 2005.
However, they “would continue to come
21
from the small upper classes.” Of businesses moving toward the
Internet, an International Data Consulting (“IDC”) survey conducted
in the first half of 2000 indicates that only ten percent of about 5000
businesses surveyed are selling online and twenty-five percent are
22
buying online in business-to-business transactions. Still, “[a]lmost
seventy percent of the businesses not presently engaged in
ecommerce buying or selling indicated they expected to be doing so
23
by yearend 2000.”
Sales in software throughout Latin America, likewise provide an
indication of what is to come for e-commerce enterprise in the
24
region. In 1998, according to the Business Software Alliance, sales
of software topped $3.54 billion (Brazil represented $1.76 billion of
the total), making Latin America second only to Asia in software
25
sales. There is every reason to assume e-commerce will follow a
similar path. In fact, industry projections are that while e-commerce
in Latin America was about $1 billion in 2000, sales should reach
$10.7 billion by 2006 as the number of Internet users in the region
26
greatly increases.

19. See Tom Stein, Microsoft Hablara Espanol, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 19, 1999, at C1.
20. See Daniel Helft, Wish on a Start, INDUSTRY STANDARD, June 18, 2001 (quoting a
report issued by Jupiter Media Metrix).
21. Elmer Lenzen, Internet in Latin Amercia: Hopes and Obstacles, INTERASIA, at
http://www.interasia.org/vietnam/hanoi_lenzen_3.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2000).
22. See Many Latin American Enterprises Poised for eBusiness Transformation, at
http://www.prenewswire.com/gh/cnoc/comp/113987.html (visited Apr. 20, 2000).
The survey was conducted by IDC’s Latin America Technology Integration Panel,
which interviewed approximately 500 companies in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.
23. Id.
24. Since 1988, the Business Software Alliance (“BSA”) has been the voice of the
world’s leading software developers before governments and with consumers in the
international marketplace. Its members represent the fastest growing industry in the
world. BSA educates computer users on software copyrights, advocates public policy
that fosters innovation and expands trade opportunities, and fights software piracy.
See Business Software Alliance, The Voice of the Industry, at http://www.bsa.org/
intnatl/about.phtml (last visited Nov. 19, 2000).
25. See George Leopold, Racks up $3.5B in Software Sales: E-commerce to Drive
Growth, ELECTRONIC ENGINEERING TIMES, Oct. 11, 1999, available at 1999 WL
21275317.
26. See Daniel Helft, E-commerce Pullback in LatAm, INDUSTRY STANDARD.COM, May
29, 2001 (quoting a report issued by Jupiter Media Matrix). Figures indicated the
average online (B2B) purchase is between $1500 and $3000, while the average (B2C)
purchase is under $100. See Latin America B2B E-Commerce—A Promising Future
InfoAmericas, Mar. 2000, at http://www.infoamericas.com/OnLineLibrary/market_
A
report_back_issues/0300/latin_america_b2b_ecommerce_.htm
[hereinafter
Promising Future] (providing a comparison of B2B and B2C commerce in Latin
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As such, the big players in the computer and Internet sector have
already established joint venture beachheads in Latin America. With
the intention of taking market share from an early start-up Latin
American tiger, New York-based StarMedia, Microsoft has formed an
online services company with Mexico’s largest telecommunications
company, Telmex, with “plans to buy access providers throughout
Latin America that can offer local service to users in countries outside
27
After acquiring the U.S.-based Internet search engine
Mexico.”
company, Lycos, the Spanish Internet service provider Terra
Networks Group has been aggressively moving into Latin America
during the last year, acquiring local portals and Internet providers
and establishing new services in fifteen Spanish and Portuguese28
speaking nations.
At the same time, America Online (“AOL”),
Yahoo!, and other Internet companies have set up similar portals for
29
expansion into the region.
Analysts identify Brazil, given its booming economy, as holding the
most promise for expansion of Internet commerce in Latin America.
The country’s human resources and a high standard of living have
combined to create explosive growth in Internet services in Brazil.
The Yankee Group, a technology consulting firm based in Boston,
Massachusetts, forecasts that Internet users in Brazil will have
increased at a compound annual growth rate (“CAGR”) of 23%
between the 2000-2006 period to almost 42.3 million, “almost three
30
times the expected number for year-end 2001.” Household users
will grow at a rate of about 20.8%, corporate users at about 22.8%,
31
and academic users at about 27.0%. Growth in the Brazilian market
is due to a number of factors, particularly from cheaper computers
entering the market (along with more affordable financing plans),

America).
27. Elinor Abreu, Hola, Microsoft, THE STANDARD, Oct. 18, 1999, available at
http://www.thestandard.com/article.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2000). The new
portal “will have offices in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Central America, Mexico,
Venezuela, and the United States.” Id. See also Telmex and Microsoft Join to Create
Region’s Leading Spanish-language Internet Portal, EDGE: WORK-GROUP COMPUTING REP.,
Oct. 25, 1999, available at 1999 WL 8114178 [hereinafter Telmex and Microsoft Join].
28. Terra operations are presently in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Spain, and
Uruguay. See Telefonica SA-Interim Results—Part 2, REG. NEWS SERV., Sept. 6, 2000,
available in LEXIS.
29. See Tom Stein, Microsoft Hablara Espanol, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 19, 1999, at C1
(comparing Microsoft’s Latin American portal to those of its rivals, AOL and Yahoo).
30. See The Yankee Group Releases Extended Internet User and Subscriber Forecast for
Brazil, BUSINESS WIRE, July 10, 2001 (quoting from a report titled “A Second Wave:
The Brazilian Internet User Forecast”).
31. See id.
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32

lower fees for Internet access, cable networking, and wireless
33
34
Other
messaging technology, now entering the marketplace.
factors include the growth of Internet services in the private business
35
sector, the opening of Internet cafes and private booths as gathering
places for Internet users to connect to the world, and the wiring and
provisioning of educational institutions where students have access to
Internet services otherwise unaffordable at home. It should be
noted, however, that even with such impressive growth, the Internet
and e-commerce are still, at least for now, at the mercy of an
36
antiquated and costly telecommunications system. Moreover, the
disparities in income distribution across the region mean that “only
about 10% to 15% of the population has the resources to become
37
active Internet users and online buyers.”
II. IDENTIFYING THE CHALLENGES
A. Cultural and Socio-Economic Issues
E-business players must overcome unique cultural, socio-economic
and linguistic challenges when moving into Latin America. Despite
what many people wrongly assume, Latin America is not a single
entity. It consists of independent countries with complex and diverse
geography, and a series of poorly connected cities that lack access to
38
navigable waterways, ports, and sophisticated air transport hubs.

32. See supra note 30; see also Patricia Howlett, Latin American E-commerce: Get
Online or Perish, IDG NEWS SERV., LATIN AM. BUREAU, June 7, 1999.
33. For example, the Wireless Internet Transaction System (WITS), a new ecommerce mobile-noticing technology, will allow both brick and mortar as well as
online retailers “to communicate with their customers, regardless of their physical
location, and conduct a mobile commerce transaction in the brick and mortar
environment.” Strio Unveils Interactive Demo for Mobile Commerce, PR NEWSWIRE, July 20,
2000.
34. See Howlett, supra note 32.
35. See Hard Facts and Hopeful Estimates, Special Reports: The Internet in Latin
America: Monitoring the Boom, LATIN AM. NEWSLS., Apr. 2000, at 4 [hereinafter Hard
Facts and Hopeful Estimates] (tracking development and prospects for Internet
industry in Latin America).
36. In the short time from when this statement is written to the time this Article
will be published, significant strides will have been made in overcoming many access
issues.
37. eMarketer, ELATIN AM. REP., at http://www.emarketer.com/estats/sell_
elamer.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2000).
38. In Bolivia, for instance, “around 40,000 km of road exists, but only 5.5% is
paved and only 20% can be classed as all-weather road.” Bolivia: Country Profile,
AMERICAS REVIEW WORLD OF INFORMATION, Sept. 4, 2000, at 9. While the Pan-America
highway passes through Bolivia between Argentina and Peru, “garage and petrol
services are sparse outside the main centers.” Id. Nicaragua has undertaken
ambitious road construction projects totaling more than $290 million with assistance
from the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, Venezuela, Denmark,

NAGLEPP.DOC

2001]

10/10/2001 11:04 AM

E-COMMERCE IN LATIN AMERICA

867

These countries contain non-homogenous markets that, despite
sharing a common language (with the exception of Brazil), differ
economically,
politically,
culturally,
technologically,
and
39
As for language, it is somewhat simplistic to
demographically.
assume that the Spanish spoken throughout Latin America is the
same, or that one dialect and one form of slang exists throughout the
40
region. One idiom of Spanish does not bridge seventeen different
41
countries, as words change meaning from region to region and can
pose problems for an e-commerce business marketing itself
42
throughout Latin America. Companies that wish to succeed in the
continent run a fatal risk if they rely on the idea that a “single
language could bridge seventeen different Spanish-speaking
countries” and the same managerial and marketing strategies will
43
apply across borders. Indeed, the region’s “diverse cultures and

and the European Union. Nicaragua is also upgrading its air and maritime shipping
infrastructure. See Transportation Overview, CARIBBEAN UPDATE, Feb. 1, 1998; see also
Paul Constance, Digital Trade Barriers, IDBAMERICA, Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 23, available at
http://www.iadb.org/exr/IDB/stories/1999/eng/e299i.htm (last visited Nov. 21,
2000) (discussing logistics of communication between commercial centers in Latin
America).
39.
Most U.S. citizens seem to believe that Latin America is homogeneous—
similar in origin, culture, politics, history, and language. Contrary to this
popular belief, Latin America is probably one of the most diverse of all
continents. Several languages are spoken in Latin America, including
Spanish, Portuguese, French, Maya, Quechua, Aymara, and numerous other
Indian dialects. Furthermore, Latin America has four major cultures, “the
Hispanic, French, West Indian, and Northern European,” and within these
four major cultures there exist numerous sub-cultures. In addition, Latin
America also has several indigenous groups such as the Aztec, Araucanian,
Inca, and Mayan Indians. Besides the cultural and linguistic differences,
Latin America also has great diversity in geography, attitudes politics and
history. Therefore, although most U.S. citizens believe that Latin America is
dominated by the Hispanic culture, one must acknowledge the existence of
other major cultures in the region in order to appreciate its diversity.
Mark B. Baker, Integration of the Americas: A Latin Renaissance or a Prescription for
Disaster?, 11 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 309, 311-12 (1997).
40. There are at least nineteen Spanish dialects. See Alexandre Rainof, How Best
to Use an Interpreter in Court, 55 CAL. ST. B.J. 196 (1980).
41. See Consumer E-commerce in Latin America—Where Is the End of the Rainbow?,
INFOAMERICAS, at http://infoamericas.com/tendencias/General/0200/consumer_
ecommerce.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2000) [herinafter End of the Rainbow]
(describing eight factors that will determine the success of e-commerce in Latin
America).
42. Many rely on the idea that a “single language could bridge all the Spanishspeaking countries” in Latin America. See id. (noting that Starmedia and Yahoo
incorrectly assumed that one, single-language web portal could successfully serve the
entire region).
43. See id. (explaining that Starmedia and Yahoo initially had a regional strategy
for Latin American marketing, but resorted to country-specific strategies when
consumers rejected their original scheme).
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languages require local, tailored marketing efforts.” To illustrate, a
Chilean fast-food chain expanded to Argentina offering to the
Argentine market what had been successful in Chile. The company
targeted 80% of sales in pork sandwiches to the Argentine market.
The offer, however failed to match the local taste; Argentinians
prefer beef. In order to survive and meet its quota, the company
“totally transformed not only its products, but also its marketing and
45
franchise policies.” Today 80% of the chain’s sales in the Argentine
46
market are beef, 15% are chicken, and only 5% are pork.
In the e-commerce marketplace, the Argentine Internet portal, El
47
Sitio, has attempted to create a regional content by employing some
80 journalists throughout Latin America to provide local input and
48
avoid a hybrid Spanish approach. Similarly, Yahoo! and StarMedia
changed to a country-specific approach when consumers rejected
their cross-border strategies. Both companies opened local offices
49
with local managers to provide specialized content. According to an
executive at one Mexican Internet start-up, “[l]ocal content and local
personalization are key to domestic growth of the Net. We do not
believe in presenting a U.S.-centric or European version of the Net to
50
Latin American users.” The U.S. and European companies moving
into the region are aware of these challenges and are entering into
ventures with regional media companies, which can help bridge the
51
content gap. Such is the case with AOL’s partnership with the
52
Cisneros Group, one of the largest media conglomerates in Latin

44. eMarketer July 1999, supra note 4, at 176.
45. See Gustavo Stoke, Adaptarse o morir, AM. ECONOMIA, Jan. 28, 1999, at 47.
46. See id. at 47.
47. See Las 50 Caras en América Latina de Internet, I-BIZ: NEGOCIOS EN RED, vol. 1,
Apr. 2000, at 36 (giving a profile on the company’s founder and CEO, Roberto
Cibrián Campoy).
48. See Robert Conlin, Latin American Portal Shifts Into High Gear, E-COMMERCE
TIMES, at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/news/articles/990729-1.shtml (last
visited Nov. 14, 2000) (describing El Sitio’s plans to expand throughout Latin
America).
49. See End of the Rainbow, supra note 41 (detailing switch from regional to
country-specific marketing strategy).
50. Latin America Will Be the World’s Fastest Growing Regional Internet Market,
TELEPOLIS, at http://www.heise.de/tp/english/inhalt/co/5997/1.html (last visited
Nov. 14, 2000) (predicting that the base of Internet users in Latin America will grow
faster than in any other region in the world).
51. America Online Inc, is the biggest Internet provider in the world. See Isabel
Darrigrandi & Pablo Bachelet, Terremoto en Internet, AM. ECONOMIA, Jan. 28, 1999, at
20.
52. The Cisneros Group is a Venezuelan conglomerate headed by Gustavo
Cisneros. It is one of the largest conglomerates in the region, with interests in Chile,
Colombia, the United States, and Venezuela. See Darrigrandi, supra note 51, at 20; see
also Samuel Silva, America Latina Got Mail!, AM. ECONOMIA, Jan. 28, 1999, at 24.
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53

America. Likewise, Hewlett-Packard teamed with StarMedia, which
claims to offer “Latin Americans, Hispanics in the United States and
residents of Spain and Portugal a pan-regional online community,
including Spanish and Portuguese content tailored for regional
54
dialects and local cultural norms.”
Another hurdle facing e-commerce businesses is how to approach
customer service and advertising, especially in a B2C environment.
In e-commerce, technology is essential to the transaction; a customer
55
sees the products on a screen prior to purchasing.
In Latin
America, however, where there is a “huge and cheap labor supply and
56
disparate social castes,” the challenge will be breaking traditional
57
“customer service expectations” of the well-heeled elite, accustomed
58
to being waited upon “hand and foot.”
Generally, Latin Americans prefer to buy products at the store,
59
where they can personally inspect them. A JP Morgan report notes
that, “many upper-class shoppers (who would have access to the
Internet) prefer the service and attention that a personal visit
60
affords.” Chileans, like many Latin Americans, “prefer to go to the
malls where they can meet with friends, enjoy their families, eat, and
61
window shop.” Latin America never has had a “catalog culture” as
62
exists in the United States. Indeed, the tactile pleasure of sampling
merchandise and negotiating a price is an important component of
63
the socio-economic fabric. “For the most part, Latinos like the idea

53. See Darrigrandi, supra note 51, at 20. One of the biggest challenges is for a
Spanish-language e-commerce entity to have Brazilian content.
54. Mary Hillebrand, HP Puts E-Commerce to Work in Latin America, E-COMMERCE
TIMES, at
http://www.ecommercetimes.com/news/articles/990910-5.shtml (last
visited Nov. 14, 2000).
55. See End of the Rainbow, supra note 41 (detailing the mechanics of ecommerce).
56. Id. (describing the effect of a large labor supply on e-commerce).
57. Id.
58. See id. (contrasting the extremely high customer service expectations of the
upper class with the inability of e-commerce to provide that level of service).
59. See The Latin American Gold Rush: Will the Internet Pan Out? Many Problems Block
the Way to Riches, at http://www.imakenews.com/texec/e-article000004782.cfm (last
visited Nov. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Latin American Gold Rush] (discussing challenges
posed by tradition and habit to Internet retailer’s increasing penetration of Latin
America).
60. “A social barrier is the idiosyncrasy of middle class people, who generally
prefer to go shopping in real shops to sitting in front of a computer purchasing via ecommerce.” O. Becerril, Mexico, in General Questionnaire, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
23, 100-01 (2000).
61. J. Otero, Chile, in General Questionnaire, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 23, 95
(2000).
62. See Latin American Gold Rush, supra note 59 (contrasting the high volume of
catalog shopping in the United States with scant Latin American retail catalog sales).
63. See Howard Buck, E-Commerce Promises Risks and Rewards, COLUMBIAN, Dec. 1,
1999, at C1 (quoting Alfredo Barriga, a Chilean e-commerce consultant). See also
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of personal relationships and buying goods from people they know.”
Moreover, the loyalty of sophisticated Latin Americans to brand
names, and a preference for buying brand names, presents a
significant obstacle to companies that will rely only on the Internet to
sell goods and otherwise have no traditional “brick and mortar”
65
market identity. This may not be a concern for a book dealer or
66
music distributor. Yet, businesses like Spiegel or Victoria’s Secret,
which have expanded into online catalog retailing, might encounter
difficulties in promoting their merchandise over a chic local boutique
in one of Latin America’s trendy malls, where being seen in the
boutique is as important (if not more so) to shoppers as what is
bought.
In addition, much of the food and household shopping is a
67
responsibility of housekeepers, who might not have the know-how or
68
authority to shop online for household goods and foodstuffs.
Studies show that the computer per household ratio remains low in
Latin America, with online buying limited to just 16% of Latin
American Internet users, compared to about 34% in the United
69
States. Still, purchases from 161 leading e-commerce retailers in
Latin America in 2000 reached $1.1 billion, reflecting a 107% growth
70
rate from the prior year.
However, the existing difficulty in a B2C setting may not be present
71
in the B2B arena. Many companies will be more readily converted
to on-line purchasing because they have been accustomed to
purchasing products through industry catalogs and regional sales

Latin American Gold Rush, supra note 59 (discussing Latin Americans’ culturally
ingrained preference for in-person shopping).
64. Stein, supra note 19 (quoting Darlene Rios Drapkin, a business assistance
manager at the Spanish Speaking Unity Council).
65. See eMarketer July 1999, supra note 4, at 172.
66. The products most commonly purchased on-line in Latin America are music,
books, PC hardware, travel and software. See End of the Rainbow, supra note 41.
67. See Collazo, supra note 1 (opining that the wealthy elite may shun ecommerce indirectly by having servants, who are not technologically savvy, shop for
them).
68. See generally General Questionnaire, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 90-104 (2000)
[hereinafter General Questionnaire]. The purchase of groceries is the exception to
Latin America’s general tendency to follow U.S. patterns of purchasing certain types
of goods and services online. Id. at 103. However, in 1999 Latin America still
managed to purchase $31 million in online retail groceries. Id.
69. See Collazo, supra note 1 (identifying the lack of household computers in
Latin America as a chief obstacle to increased online retail sales).
70. IDC Latin America’s Surveyed Web Pioneers Will Reach U.S.$6.9 Million in Online
Sales per Company in 2000, PR NEWSWIRE, Dec. 7, 2000.
71. See Latin America B2B E-Commerce—A Promising Future, TENDENCIAS, Mar. 2000,
at 1 (presenting the assessment that Latin American B2B e-commerce faces less
problems than B2C e-commerce), available at http://www.infoamericas.com/
Tendencias/market_report_archive.htm.
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representatives.
Another cultural and socio-economic hindrance to e-commerce is
payment. In North America and Europe, the credit card is the
primary method for conducting transactions. This is not so in Latin
America, where payments are usually made in cash. If sales are made
via credit card, payments are normally face-to-face transactions. More
significantly, unlike in the United States where 65% of households
have a credit card, only “14% of households in the combined markets
73
of Mexico, Brazil and Argentina have a credit card.” Obtaining and
using a credit card in Latin America is still very much a luxury of the
74
“The low penetration of credit cards in Latin America
wealthy.
stems both from a lack of collateral by consumers and from a low
75
appetite for risk among debt-ridden (bank) card issuers.” Only 27%
76
of Argentinians and 21% of Mexicans possess credit cards, and they
do not necessarily favor them for making purchases. Latin Americans
prefer to pay in cash rather than using credit cards because credit
card interest rates are quite high, as much as 40% in Brazil and
77
Mexico —forcing cardholders to use them judiciously. “This is a
significant deterrent, since ultimately the ability to pay online is a
78
79
central function of e-commerce.” Uruguay has the highest level of
credit usage, at 33% of commercial transactions, while most other
major countries in the region are below 20% (Brazil at 18%, Mexico
80
at 14%, Colombia at 13%, and Venezuela at 12%). Risk aversion by
the bank industry in the region also accounts for low credit card
penetration, a reaction to the liquidity crush banks suffered during
the economic crises in Mexico, Brazil and Argentina in the early
1990s when interest rates rose and consumers faced huge credit card

72. See id. (listing characteristics that make an industry ready to switch to eprocurement).
73. End of the Rainbow, supra note 41 (assessing the level of credit card use in
Latin America).
74. See Vanyi-Robin, U.S.A., in General Questionnaire, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
23, 102 (2000) (discussing how the limited availability of credit cards and wealthy
people who can afford to utilize them seriously impedes Latin American ecommerce).
75. End of the Rainbow, supra note 41.
76. See Vanyi-Robin, supra note 74, at 102-03 (listing credit card penetration rates
of Argentina and Mexico specifically, while stating that penetration rates elsewhere
in Latin America are below 15%).
77. See Collazo, supra note 1, at 50.
78. Vanyi-Robin, supra note 74, at 102-03. “However, research suggests that
security is no more of a deterrent to online spending in Latin America than in more
developed markets such as in the United States.” Id.
79. But see Jon Weisman, Latin American E-Commerce Still Facing Hurdles, ECOMMERCE TIMES, Aug. 24, 2000, at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/news (stating
that Argentina’s 30% credit card penetration level is Latin America’s highest).
80. See eMarketer July 1999, supra note 4, at 177.
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Compounding the crisis, the banks were also hit with
bills.
numerous bad loans and constrained by laws that “restrict banks’
82
ability to repossess assets or even re-call loans.”
Another problem for Latin American e-commerce start-ups is that
much of the money made through electronic transactions in Latin
83
America is leaving the region. According to IDC research, “75% of
the purchases made by Latin users are made outside the region,
going to [sites in the United States] to make their e-commerce
84
purchases,” often for items that are hard to find in Latin America.
Latin American e-commerce start-ups, however, are picking up many
cues from studying the customer service tactics of companies in the
85
United States.
The Argentine bookstore, Librerias Yenny, offers
services otherwise unavailable in its long-established “brick and
mortar” locations, such as customized customer reviews of books
86
tailored to the customer’s interests or favorite authors. Many Latin
American businesses looking to expand into Internet commerce are
pragmatic enough to realize that if they can wait for the
telecommunications problems to be resolved, their businesses will
87
succeed.


81. See End of the Rainbow, supra note 41 (stating historical reasons for some Latin
American banks’ risk-aversion). In order to overcome the credit card barrier and
promote e-commerce, there is a pilot project in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. These
countries are using “smart card money- programmable chips that can hold any
quantity of currency.” These cards are sold at any store and they use the same
technology as the one used for making calls on pay phones. Each card has a “scratch
and see PIN number that could be used for on-line purchasing.” Id.
82. Id. Domestic banks in Argentina and Mexico “have been forced to take on
foreign investors or sell out right to government liquidators or to foreign banks. In
Brazil the banking industry has reacted by consolidating from more than 120 players
to fewer than 90.” Id.
83. See Collazo, supra note 1, at 50 (lamenting that the majority of revenues
derived from Latin American e-commerce lands in the hands of non-Latin American
sites).
84. Id.
85. See The Ups and Downs of Cyber Business, LATINFINANCE, June 1999, at 51, 56
(citing Annika Alford’s assertion that Latin American e-commerce sites can rival
United States competitors like Amazon.com by providing the same services without
high shipping and customs charges).
86. See Collazo, supra note 1, at 48-49 (highlighting various Latin American
companies’ methods for successfully marketing to online customers).
87. See Stein, supra note 19 (noting that Microsoft views e-commerce
opportunities in Latin America with great optimism despite the existence of serious
telecommunication barriers).
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B. Infrastructure Issues
1.

Telecommunications and access
a.

Costs

Although the potential for explosive growth exists in Latin
America, the Internet has been slow to expand into the region’s
88
consumer arena. “Only 4.8 million Latinos, or 4% of all Internet
users, logged on” in 1998, and Latin America generated only $167
89
At present, only about 10% of Latin
million in Internet sales.
90
Americans have telephones (many Latin Americans have neither
phone lines nor electricity), and even fewer, about 5% of households,
91
Furthermore, computers are prohibitively
own a computer.
expensive for the middle class, and considered a luxury affordable
92
only by those who have disposable income.
A well-equipped
93
computer can “cost half of an average worker’s yearly pay.”
However, that is not to imply that computers are not being
94
purchased. In fact, according to a survey conducted by the Yankee
Group, “The computer has superseded the television as the second
most desired item on consumer shopping lists in Brazil (autos are
95
number one).” An IDC report issued in February of 1999 indicated
the entry of low cost systems into the Latin American market has
begun to have an impact, with Brazil and Argentina leading the way
96
in purchasing.
“According to IDC data, the average cost of a
desktop system in Latin America was down to $1340 in Q4 1998
versus roughly $1500 at the beginning of the year, and over $1700

88. See id. (indicating that Latin America has yet to realize its enormous ecommerce potential).
89. Id. (citing a study by International Data Corporation).
90. See id. (citing the fact that only 1 in 10 Latinos has a phone line as one of the
biggest obstacles to e-commerce in that region).
91. According to Jupiter Media Metrix, at the same time, 12% of households own
mobile phones, and “by 2005 39% of the population will have cell phones, while only
13% will have PCs.” See Daniel Helft, Wish on a Star, INDUSTRY STANDARD, June 18,
2001.
92. See Mike Francis, E-commerce, LATIN AMERICA WEBSITE PROJECT, last updated
Feb.
29,
2000,
at
http://www.intl.pdx.edu/latin/economy/ecom_ec.html
(concluding that Latin American e-consumers, unlike the majority of Latin
Americans, have ample disposable income).
93. Collazo, supra note 1, at 50 (citing a report by JP Morgan).
94. See, e.g., Latin America Personal Computer Market Meets Forecast Despite Obstacles,
According to IDC, Feb. 10, 1999 [hereinafter Latin America Personal Computer Market], at
http://www.idc.com/Data/LatinAmerica/Content/LA021099PR.htm (noting that
1998 personal computer sales to Latin America were higher than predicted).
95. eMarketer July 1999, supra note 4, at 185 (citing the Yankee Group report).
96. See Latin America Personal Computer Market, supra note 94 (assessing reasons for
better than expected personal computer sales).
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97

In 1999, sales of personal computers in Latin
during 1997.”
America topped 5.9 million units, “a value of $7.39 billion for the
98
99
year.” However, even if one can acquire a computer, consumers in
Latin America cannot upgrade their computers at the same rate as
consumers in the United States or Europe, and the cost to add
peripherals and upgrade is still quite high and technical support is
100
not very sophisticated or readily available. Furthermore, “only 20%
101
of the PCs in the region are connected to the Internet.” Of those
Latin Americans connected to the Internet in 1999, Brazil had 46.3%
102
of the share, with the remaining percentages as follows: Mexico,
103
10.8; Colombia, 7.8; Argentina, 6.8; Chile, 2.7; and Others, 20.8.
One solution, notes one Internet developer, is “to develop
sophisticated products that run on the simplest hardware and that
104
can work in even the most undeveloped markets.”
Latin Americans pay some of the highest fees in the world for
105
logging onto the Internet. Currently, the cost to access the Internet
106
is nearly ten times the access costs in the United States because
local calls throughout Latin America are charged by the minute—
making Internet browsing prohibitively expensive, even for the
107
affluent. Many analysts agree that “[b]asic telephone costs pose the
108
single largest barrier to growth in Internet usage in” the region,
with users spending an average of $53 a month on service fees and

97. Id.
98. Sherman Fridman, Californians’ Online Spending Highest in U.S., E-COMMERCE
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2000, at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/news (reporting statistics
generated from research by the International Data Corporation on the growth of the
personal computer market in Latin America).
99. See Latin America Personal Computer Market, supra note 94 (reporting 4.16
million personal computers sold in 1998, representing a 12% improvement from
1997).
100. See Ken Warn, Internet: Well Placed to Lead the Latest Revolution, FIN. TIMES
SURVEY, Dec. 15, 1999, at http://www.ft.com/ftsurveys/country/scaf82.htm (noting
that one of the drawbacks of Argentine companies is their inability to upgrade their
computers as quickly as their United States counterparts).
101. See Foreword, Technological Edge Supplement, LATINFINANCE, Sept. 1999, at 5
(describing obstacles to e-commerce growth in Latin America).
102. See Hard Facts and Hopeful Estimates, supra note 35.
103. See id.
104. Warn, supra note 100 (quoting Mookie Tannenbaum, development manager
for United Sites of America).
105. See Weisman, supra note 79 (noting the prohibitive cost of Internet access in
Latin America).
106. See Stein, supra note 19 (attributing high access costs to inadequate
telecommunications networks in Latin America).
107. See Constance, supra note 38 (concluding that Latin American e-consumers
pay more than their United States counterparts to shop online because most Latin
American phone companies charge by the minute for local phone calls).
108. Id. (quoting an IDC Latin America report surveying Latin American
countries).
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109

local phone charges versus an average of $20 per month in the
110
The cost of using the Internet is prohibitively high
United States.
due to two unavoidable fees incurred by the user: (1) an access and
monthly rate to an Internet Service Provider (ISP), and (2) an
assessment fee from the local telephone company for a use-per111
minute charge during the connection.
This practice translates to
112
an average of $60 monthly Internet access costs in Argentina, and
about $52.71 for the rest of Latin America, with the telephone
113
connection responsible for about half the cost.
114
Some ISPs have begun offering free access, but users still must
115
pay a per minute charge, something that can become quite costly
116
when downloading information. One project, Red Alternativa S.A.,
funded in large measure by George Soros, will “become a full service
telecommunications provider, including developing its free Internet
117
service.”
The move is not exactly altruistic, however. The Soros
118
hedge fund backing the project, Quantum Dolphin PLC, plans to
use Red Alternativa, S.A. in part to attract potential customers to
various Quantum Dolphin ventures, including CreditCompany.com,
an online loan company; altovinest.com, a personal finance site; and
119
altrocity.com, an online retailer.
One government taking the lead in free access to online services is
Costa Rica, which last June established free email access for all 3.5
120
121
The pilot project, named Punto.com, is being
million citizens.

109. See Robert Collier, After a Slow Start, Internet Use Growing Fast in Latin America,
SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Sept. 27, 1999, at A17.
110. See Constance, supra note 38 (contrasting Internet access costs in Latin
America and the United States).
111. See Otero, supra note 61, at 96 (delineating the cost of Internet access in
Latin American countries using Chile as an example).
112. But see Weisman, supra note 79 (examining Argentina as an example of Latin
America’s prohibitive Internet access costs).
113. See eMarketer, THE EGLOBAL REP., Mar. 2000, at 227 [hereinafter “eMarketer
March 2000”].
114. See Constance, supra note 38 (stating that Terra Networks, the Internet
branch of Spanish telecommunications company Telfonica, has launched free ISP
access in Brazil and StarMedia Network has launched free ISP access throughout
Latin America).
115. See id. (explaining that unlike the low flat rate for an Internet connection in
the United States, most Latin American countries charge by the minute for an
Internet connection).
116. See eMarketer March 2000, supra note 113, at 227.
117. Red Alternativa was “established a year ago by Argentine entrepreneur
Maximiliano Fernández as a long-distance telephone carrier service for small
business. Since then, it has built up a portfolio of 1,300 customers in five cities.” Free
Internet Access Provider Backed Through Soros Fund, LATIN AM. PRIVATE EQUITY ANALYST,
Mar. 2000, at 7 [hereinafter “Private Equity Analyist”].
118. This fund is valued at more than $300 million. See id.
119. See id.
120. See Costa Rica Offers Free Email to all Residents, WORLD ONLINE CENTERFRAME,
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run by the postal service and a state-run entity called Radiografica
122
Costarricense (Racsa). As part of the program, citizens will be able
to access public terminals installed in public buildings and
123
institutions for those who do not own their own computers.
In
addition, the Costa Rica’s postal service has contracted “to extend
Punto.com to the rest of the countries of Central America and the
124
Dominican Republic, starting with Nicaragua and Honduras.”
b.

Reliability

Telephone reliability is also a problem for conducting business
online. Poor Internet performance is very common in Latin
125
America.
Brazil, for instance, has one of the most advanced
banking systems in the world and is well situated to lead the
revolution in e-commerce and online financial services, but making a
successful phone call across town in Sao Paolo is still an uncertain
126
However, as telecom systems improve due to
undertaking.
privatization (twenty countries in the region signed the 1997 World
Trade Organization (WTO) agreement on basic telecommunication
127
services), and as more Spanish and Portuguese language portals
and other services come online, Latin Americans will become more
familiar with Internet transactions and the numbers should change
rapidly.
Participants in the WTO’s session on e-commerce in 1999 noted
that there is a huge technology gap in developing nations, even
though worldwide telecom capacities will multiply 100,000 times in
the next decade, with new cables carrying “1,000 times the capacity of

June 4, 2000, at http://www.apnic.net/mailing_lists/apple/0006/msg00004.html
(establishing free e-mail access to Costa Rica’s entire population while promising to
expand the free access to the rest of Central America).
121. See id. (describing Punto.com, a six-month pilot project to provide free e-mail
access to all Costa Ricans).
122. See id. (defining Racsa, a subsidiary of the state-run telecommunications
system). See also Costa Rica: Country Profile, AMERICAS REVIEW WORLD OF INFORMATION,
Sept. 4, 2000, at 1, available at 2000 WL 26592452 (explaining that Racsa is
responsible for all written telecommunications and data transmission services).
123. See Costa Rica Offers Free E-mail to All Residents, supra note 120 (explaining that
city buildings and other public institutions in Costa Rica have been given computers
so that Costa Ricans who do not have their own computers can still have access to the
Internet).
124. Id.
125. See Otero, supra note 61, at 95 (explaining that Chilean Internet users may
experience poor Internet service during peak usage hours).
126. See Foreword, Technological Edge Supplement, supra note 101 (discussing the
variation in the levels of technological advancement across Latin America).
127. See Constance, supra note 38 (detailing Latin American governments’
commitment to an open telecommunications market).
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Although the
all the world’s wire from just two years ago.”
implications for development of e-commerce in the developing world
are staggering, the need to address the reliability of the infrastructure
to deliver consistent service sobers one’s vision of a Latin American
129
Internet revolution.
If Brazil represents the largest untapped market for Internet
growth, Argentina has taken the lead in improving the reliability of
national telecommunications over the last two years. Argentina has
utilized a highly skilled, relatively cheap labor pool from which to
draw in reworking the technical infrastructure. The modification has
begun
with
deregulating
the
government-controlled
telecommunications sector. Boston Consulting Group noted that,
“deregulation of the telecoms sector, which has resulted in a 50%
reduction in Internet telephone charges, is working to change both
130
the real and perceived costs of going online,” although the cost is
still high, with per minute pricing structures that will induce retailers
to “pare their online catalogs to include only those items likely to be
131
of intense interest to web users.”
Lagging behind is the rest of
Latin America, which is in the process of re-tooling the telecom
sector, including entering into joint ventures with foreign telecom
132
giants.
Such is the case in Mexico where the state-owned Telmex
has entered into an agreement with Microsoft to upgrade the
nation’s telecommunications infrastructure and create a large
133
Internet portal network.
But Telmex has been responsible for
hindering the growth of e-commerce, as evidenced by an IDC study
that shows that Mexico’s home usage is 29%, compared to 80% in
134
Brazil. The lack of growth in the consumer market is indicative of

128. See Howard Buck, World Trade Meeting Touches on Technology Gap in Developing
Nations, COLUMBIAN, Dec. 1, 1999, at 5 (reporting that telecommunications is
expected to expand rapidly during the next decade).
129. See Frank Bajak, While Magnet for U.S. Investment, Latin Startups Face Big
Obstacles, ASSOCIATED PRESS (AP) NEWSWIRES, Apr. 3, 2000 (exclaiming that Latin
America’s Internet growth is rapid and that the region’s 10 million users will increase
to about 67 million users by 2005).
130. Warn, supra note 100.
131. eMarketer July 1999, supra note 4, at 177 (quoting Betsy Scolnik of StarMedia
Network).
132. See, e.g., Meet the Mechanic: Roberto Colaninno, Chief Executive of Olivetti, Has
What it Takes to Turn Telecom Italia Around. That Should Worry the Politicians Who Want
to Make it a National Champion, ECONOMIST, May 29, 1999, at 68 (stating that Telecom
Italia has started foreign investment ventures in Latin America and some other
areas).
133. See Telmex and Microsoft Join, supra note 27 (detailing how the joint venture
agreement aims to provide Spanish-language Internet services across the Americas).
134. See New IDC Study Examines Latin American Internet Access Providers and Explores
Their Impact on the Overall IT and Communications Market, PR NEWSWIRE, Sept. 15, 1998
(financial news).
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the high access costs in Mexico versus elsewhere in Latin America.
c.

Overcoming access problems

Recognizing that the acquisition of a computer and the ability to
get online are beyond the means of most Latin Americans,
governments in Latin America are making a concerted effort to bring
computers and the Internet into schools and public gathering places
with the goal of expanding “the pool of talent that will transform the
135
region into a fully functional, 21st century technological society.”
“[O]ver the past two years, a movement has gained significant
momentum to put a dent in what has been called Latin America’s
136
‘digital apartheid.’” And the efforts have been dramatic. In Peru,
grants from a Lima-based nonprofit group, the local telephone
utility, and the Canadian government, brought the Internet to a
137
remote Indian tribe, the Ashaninka.
The package included “a
portable generator, a satellite dish and a big screen monitor for video
138
conferencing for high school education.”
Since the computer
arrived in the village, the tribe has entered the world of e-commerce
by building a web site for selling “organically grown oranges in Lima,
139
250 miles to the east.”
Also in Peru, the establishment of public Internet booths and
cybercafes by a group called Rede Científica Peruana (RCP) has
140
addressed the lack of phones among low-income citizens. This type
141
Jose Soriano,
of access accounts for 40% of Internet use in Peru.
the founder of RCP, notes that “Internet access through leased lines
and shared devices in community centers—not just individual dial-up
access—holds the key for growing the Internet as a mass medium in
142
emerging economies.”
The access at public booths is also more
cost effective, although the question arises as to whether those on

135. See Foreword, Technological Edge Supplement, supra note 101 (discussing the
efforts of Latin American governments to increase the overall level of computer
education).
136. See Anthony Faiola & Stephen Buckley, Poor Embrace the Internet’s Promise,
GUARDIAN (London), July 20, 2000, at 29.
137. See id. (describing the benefits of Internet access to the Central Peruvian
Ashaninka Indian Village).
138. Id.
139. Id. The venture has increased the tribe’s revenue by 10%. Id.
140. See Public Booths and Cybercafés, Special Reports, The Internet in Latin America:
Monitoring the Boom, LATIN AM. NEWSLS., Apr. 2000, at 4.
141. Id.
142. Quoting businessman José Soriano, founder of RCP, in Madanmohan Rao,
Latin America Will Be the World’s Fastest Growing Regional Internet Market, TELEPOLIS
(visited Aug. 21, 2000) <http://www.heise.de/tp/english/inhalt/co/5997/1.html>.
RCP is also expanding the concept of Internet centers and cybercafes to Argentina,
Brazil, Colombia, and El Salvador. See id.
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limited incomes who connect to the Internet via public booths are
going to have the financial resources to participate in e-commerce.
Peruvians pay from $.75 to $1.70 per hour. In contrast, in Argentina,
which has more than 700 public booths, the cost rises to $5.00 per
143
hour. Cybercafes are also becoming an important part of the social
fabric of Latin America as popular meeting places. PapayaNet, a
cybercafe in Ecuador, claims to serve 300 customers each day, and
144
Rene Crespo, an Ecuadoran
many of the visitors are tourists.
cybercafe entrepreneur, states, “[w]e get a steady stream of tourists
and locals to the cybercafe, but our real target is the e-commerce
145
market in Ecuador.”
Latin American countries are beginning to provide Internet access
to public schools as a means of bringing online services to the
146
Brazil has cut a deal with the state of São Paulo to wire
region.
thousands of schools with Internet access and stimulate the process of
democratization. Chile has completed wiring more than 1200 public
147
high schools with the Internet, and Argentina spent $1 billion in
2000 “to offer personal computer loans to people who cannot afford
148
conventional credit.” Similarly, the Dominican Republic undertook
efforts to connect all 310 of its public high schools to the Internet, via
149
broadband satellite Internet and Intranet connections. The project
has been made possible by a $25 million contract with a Dominican
communications firm, Tricom.
Cable, wireless, and satellite access provide an alternative to high
access charges over phone lines, and cable operators in the region

143. See id.
144. See Cybercafes Popular Tourist Attractions in South America, INTERNETNEWS.COM,
Nov. 11, 1998, at http://www.internetnews.com/intl-news/print/0,,6_39361,00.html
(describing the growing popularity of cybercafes in Latin America).
145. Id.
146. Cf. Faiola & Buckley, supra note 136 (explaining that several Latin American
governments provide Internet access to their young and poor citizens in order to
bridge the widening gap between the social classes).
147. See id. (detailing how the Chilean government prioritized Internet access for
the nation’s young people).
148. Id. Regarding the program, Dante Caputo, Argentina’s technology secretary
stated,
[w]e cannot make the same mistake twice, allowing the new economy to
become just as unequal and unjust as the old economy in Latin America. We
have got to do everything in our power to make sure that the poor have
access to the Internet. It is our best chance to begin to achieve some kind of
social and economic justice here.
Id.
149. See Global News Analysis, Dominican Republic: Expanding the Internet’s Reach,
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT 2000, at http://ebusinessforum.com (last visited Mar.
10, 2001) [hereinafter Global News Analysis] (detailing the Dominican Republic’s
efforts at modernization of its communications systems).
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are, perhaps somewhat unrealistically, predicting 500% growth in
service, “while dial-up and dedicated ISPs anticipate the number of
150
One may wonder how cable
their accounts will rise only 90%.”
access to remote areas and rural towns separated by very rugged
terrain could be accomplished more successfully than installing
telephone lines. Wireless may provide greater coverage to rural and
remote areas in the region. Wireless costs have gone down
significantly in Brazil, where “furious market competition and the
devaluation of the currency have brought Internet rates down from
40 dollars a month two years ago to roughly 10 dollars [a month]
151
today.”
Notwithstanding how they access the Internet, once potential
consumers are online and ready to search the Internet, they discover
Latin American businesses that are ready to take on their business.
These businesses, targeting the B2C market, are growing at a dizzying
152
pace. According to the International Data Corporation, as of 1999,
90% of Latin American businesses have or are developing a website,
80% have or are developing an Intranet, 45% have or are developing
153
an Extranet, and 44% have or are developing an e-commerce site.
Analysts at Salomon Smith Barney listed 375 Latin American firms on
the Internet as of August 1999, up from 269 in 1998 and 138 in
154
1997.
BCG’s analysts identified 422 Latin American companies
155
selling online during 1999. “[O]f these, 73% are in Brazil, 12% in
Mexico, 9% in Argentina and 6% spread out over the rest of the
156
region.”
Even though Brazil’s numbers are encouragingly high, it
must be noted that e-commerce in Brazil is largely limited to Brazil,
as the use of Portuguese constrains Brazilian companies from
157
expanding significantly beyond Brazil’s border.
This disadvantage
should abate very quickly, however, as more joint ventures with
foreign investors and dot-com companies acquire stakes in or

150. EMarketer, Telephone Costs Holding Back Access in Latin America, Sept. 28, 1998,
available at http://www.emarketer.com (visited Aug. 21, 2000).
151. Faiola & Buckley, supra note 136.
152. See Chase H&Q: LatAm Companies Have Portal Advantage—Regional, BUSINESS
NEWS AMERICAS, July 18, 2000, available at 2000 WL 22217716 (predicting that B2C ecommerce in Latin America will grow to $3.1 billion by 2003).
153. See eMarketer July 1999, supra note 4, at 179.
154. See Will the Net Attract Enough Shoppers?, in Special Reports: The Internet in Latin
America: Monitoring the Boom, LATIN AM. NEWSLS., Apr. 2000, at 7.
155. See id.
156. Id.
157. See Bajak, supra note 129 (stating that even though Brazil is responsible for
between 45% and 50% of Latin American e-commerce, approximately 90% of that
business is local to Brazil).
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158

2.

Monopolies, the government, and privatization
There is a consensus among the Latin American governments that
the most effective way to bring their countries to a more competitive
marketplace is by promoting free market conditions in the
159
“Telecommunications are without a
telecommunication field.
doubt one of the driving forces behind the economic development of
160
If e-commerce is to become an
[Latin American] countries.”
underpinning for the new economies of Latin America, the region’s
governments must commit to real improvement of their
infrastructure by opening telecommunications markets to
competition, by truly privatizing, and by de-regulating the
161
telecommunications industry.
However, Latin American countries
still struggle with the method of privatization, and therein lies the
162
challenge.
Even after some twenty years of moving toward
privatization, many governments still express tremendous resistance
163
to deregulating and privatizing the telecommunications markets.
For decades, state-owned and privately owned monopolies have
controlled the telecommunications industry throughout Latin
America, and governments have granted them carte blanche to do
164
essentially whatever they wanted.
Yet, the development levels of
state-owned telecommunications monopolies “have been inferior to
165
those of more developed countries.” These monopolies succeeded
mainly in creating obstacles to the development of Internet

158. See id. (explaining that Latin American start-ups with U.S. venture capital are
renting office space in Florida for their companies).
159. See Charles C. Loveridge, Policy and Market Revision Task Force:
Telecommunications Regulatory Affairs in the Americas, in A Report for the Inter-American
Development Bank, Aug. 10, 1997, at http://www.iadb.org/Documents/ (discussing
telecommunications agreement established at the Summit of the Americas).
160. Sandra Reed, Privatization of Latin American Telecommunications Firms, at
http://www.lectlaw.com/filesh/il-2.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2000).
161. See id. (explaining the need for deregulation of telecommunications in Latin
America).
162. See Gonzalo García Jiménez, Spanish Investment Strategies in Latin America’s
Telecommunications Sector: Conquistadores Redux?, 7 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 83, 89-90
(1998) (discussing methods used by Latin American countries to privatize the
telecommunications industry).
163. See Loveridge, supra note 159 (stating that the majority of Latin American
countries have not agreed to reform their telecommunications industries).
164. In a state-owned monopoly (or natural monopoly) the state is the sole
provider of local and long distance services. An artificial monopoly would be one in
which the state has a stake in a monopoly but is not the sole owner. For information
on the privatization process in Latin America, see Gonzalo García Jiménez, supra
note 162.
165. Reed, supra note 160 (explaining that Latin America has fallen behind other
countries in the global telecommunications arena).
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166

technology.
The telecommunications monopolies have been allowed to force
Internet service providers (ISPs) to route the dial-up call through the
167
local telephone company.
With local providers seeking to
maximize control of and profit from their services by using a
“measured local service rate system,” charging by the minute during
168
the connection makes surfing the Internet very costly. As a result,
some 80% of businesses in Latin America still conduct business via
169
fax and paper.
Consequently, the private business sectors have
begun pressuring governments to implement new regulations and
laws
allowing
and
encouraging
full
privatization
of
170
telecommunications, emphasizing that the new technology entering
171
the marketplace cannot wait.
To understand fully why today’s state of telecommunications
adversely affects e-commerce, it is necessary to first examine the type
of monopoly that existed in some Latin American nations prior to
1980, the type of monopoly that evolved afterwards, and the type that
exists today.
Prior to 1980, telecommunications were owned by state-owned
public companies that constituted 100% of the telecommunications
172
industry. While in state hands, telecommunications services proved
to be inefficient; service was poor and slow; and demand went
173
unmet. There were widespread problems in the infrastructure, the

166. See Jorge Miguel Otero, Panel VII: Taxes, Tariffs, and other Regulatory Barriers to
Electronic Commerce, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 183, 184 (2000) (discussing the
chilling effects of monopolies on telecommunications technology development).
167. See id. (detailing the difficulties new Internet technology providers face when
entering the Latin American market).
168. See id. (explaining how local telecommunications monopolies are able to
exercise control over Internet access).
Hopes and Obstacles, at
169. See Elmer Lenzen, Internet in Latin Amercia:
http://www.interasia.org/vietnam/hanoi_lenzen_3.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2000)
(discussing how the cost of Internet access prohibits many businesses from
technologically advancing to electronic communications).
170. In response to rising demand for better telecommunications, the Brazilian
government approved Decree 99.179 in March of 1990 which “allowed private capital
to provide information services, private telecom exchanges in residential and
business buildings, community telephone programs, and cellular mobile phone
services.”
Antonio Jose J. Botelho et al., Telecommunications in Brazil, at
http://www.vii.org/papers/braz_ox.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2000) (illustrating
telecommunications reform efforts in Brazil).
171. U.S. Senator Max Baucus stated that Latin American governments can
encourage e-commerce by “open[ing] up telecommunications to competition.” See
Max Baucus, Speech: International Trade Aspects of E-Commerce, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 208, 211 (2000) (emphasizing the important role of modern telecommunications
technology for developing nations).
172. See García Jiménez, supra note 162, at 86 (“State-owned telephone companies
were sole providers of both local and long-distance telephone service.”).
173. García Jiménez illustrated the quality of state-owned services:
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companies were highly politicized, and operations were in the hands
174
Particularly during
of sometimes unruly unionized workers.
periods of economic erosion, the climate of Latin America’s trade
and commerce proved unsuitable to the technological changes
175
brought by advances in communications.
Some countries realized
that the inadequate telecommunications structure constituted an
“obstacle to economic and social development” and went about
176
implementing reforms in the sector.
The countries in the region
had a similar goal to improve telecommunications as the vital force
177
behind economic development.
Nevertheless, different countries
underwent different processes and mechanisms for transferring
178
telecommunications to the private sector.

Before privatization the picture was, in general, distressing. In Chile, service
penetration was low (about three telephone lines per 100 habitants), waiting
lists for new lines reached 50% of the lines in service, and due to coexistence
between old and new technologies, service innovation was rather small. In
Argentina, ENTEL was in complete disarray with more than 8% of the 90%
of all public network subscribers out of service, 8.8 telephone lines per 100
inhabitants, almost endless waiting lists, a very low quality of service
(telephone calls were completed an estimated 49% for urban calls and 29%
for long-distance), management widely perceived as corrupt, and its 45,000
employees, most of whom were unionized in state, on permanent strike. In
Venezuela, although it was the fourth largest telecommunications sector in
Latin America, as much as 55% of basic demand was not met, eight lines per
100 inhabitants, and wating lists had an average of eight years. In Peru,
waiting lists were three years and line density only 3%. Conversely, in the
case of Mexico, although performance also deteriorated (waiting lists of
about three years and service penetration still low), the picture was more
optimistic for one reason: in comparison with the other state-owned
telecommunications companies, TELMEX was a fairly well-run company.
Id.
174. Argentinian state-owned company ENTEL failed to have professional
managerial direction and was highly politicized. See Marcelo Celani, Series Reforma
Economicas, Determinantes de la Inversion en Telecomunicaciones en Argentina, at 11 (on
file with author). The unionized workers of TELECOM Colombia forced the
government to desist from its privatization attempt by going on strike for a week,
suspending all local, national and international communication service. See Margot
Lise Hooley, Telecommunications in Colombia, at http://www.vii.org/papers/colo.htm
(last visited Nov. 20, 2000) (detailing the intense opposition to privatization efforts in
Columbia).
175. See generally García Jiménez, supra note 162, at 87 (discussing how the telecom
sector under state ownership hindered development due to the state’s inability to
respond to rapid advances in technology).
176. In 1989, Argentine President Carlos Menem privatized several sectors of the
government to encourage strong economic development. See Celani, supra note 174,
at 14.
177. See García Jiménez, supra note 162, at 87 (discussing the common purposes
for telecommunications reform in Latin America).
178. Privatization in Latin American countries proceeded according to the
following steps:
•Argentina: Privatization through the sale of 60% of the stock. These stocks
were sold to international operators. 40% of the stocks were divided
among the company workers, cooperatives and the public in general.
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Beginning in the late 1980s, Latin American nations began the
slow and painful process of economic reform, beginning with Chile
in 1988, and followed by Argentina and Mexico in 1990, Venezuela in
1992, and Peru in 1994.
Much of the stimulus for change came from the disappointments
of the 1980’s—the “lost decade.” The numbers tell a tale of sharply
lower, even declining, rates of growth. By the end of that decade,
most observers had come to realize that the inward-looking import
substitution policies forged in the 1950s and 1960s had run their
course. Cut off from the technological advances enjoyed by the
rest of the free world, and saddled with cumbersome public
enterprises wielding monopoly power, the inward-looking policies
had rapidly trapped Latin America in a pattern of ever increasing
waste and inefficiency that eroded their resource base, spawned
wholesale macroeconomic instability, and left them powerless to

Concessions were awarded in exclusivity for between 6 to 10 years.
However, from the beginning cellular phone services were open to free
competition.
•Bolivia: Privatization done through capitalization by selling the right to
contribute to the state company, ENTEL (50% holding with the right to
administrate the company) and to promote comprehensive
shareholding, the remaining 50% was divided among Bolivians. ENTEL
offers cellular communications.
•Brazil: Until recently Article 21 of the Brazilian constitution established
state monopoly by prohibiting the participation of private companies,
local or foreign, in the supplying of telecommunications services. This
prohibition was overruled through the modification of Article 21.
However, under the reformed article only Congress, by issuing a law,
was be able to regulate telecommunication.
Therefore, the
constitutional monopoly was in place until Congress enacted a law
establishing the conditions under which participation will be granted
capital in this sector. Moreover, under Brazil’s Telecommunications
Law, foreign participation in the telecommunications sector is limited to
49%.In July 1997, Congress passed the new telecommunications law
restructuring and privatizing the State-owned company, TELEBRAS,
leaving the state as a regulator and removing it from ownership. Under
the law, foreign ownership is limited and the government retains a
majority ownership.
•Colombia: Mixed. The basic services are held by the state-owned company,
TELECOM, that “retains exclusive control over most long-distance
service and all of the more lucrative international service.” “In 1994, the
government awarded licenses to six cellular companies, and in 1996, the
Ministry of Communications opened bidding for two long-distance
concessions (a third would automatically be assigned to TELECOM).
•Chile: Fully competitive. Under the law, the same company can provide
local and long distance telephone service if it is done through
independent “subsidiaries constituted as open charter companies.
•Ecuador: Currently undergoing privatization. Peru: Privatization was done
through the sale of stocks.
•Venezuela: Privatization through the sale of stock.
See generally Reed, supra note 160 (surveying the processes of telecommunications
across Latin America); see also Loveridge, supra note 159 (providing an overview of
privatization efforts in several Latin American countries).
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grasp the advantages integration might otherwise have offered.

In order to attract investors during the 1980s, the governments that
decided to privatize did so by giving private companies a term
180
monopoly. In telecommunications, privatization was accomplished
by granting private companies operating concessions with monopoly
privileges for the provision of basic telephone services and local and
181
long distance. The term of the concessions ranged from six years in
182
Mexico, to eight in Venezuela, and up to ten years in Argentina.
Monopoly rights could end and not be extended if the company
failed to have strong investment plans and increased growth of
183
services in urban and rural areas. What evolved was a method of
privatization that suppressed true competition and failed to improve
184
the quality and volume of telecommunications services.
Also,
demand for lines outpaced the number of lines available, and service
185
coverage was confined primarily to the major cities.
Now, many years later, technology leaders favor private sector
competition for bearing the brunt of e-commerce expansion into
Latin America as a less potentially harmful strategy for the developing
186
world.
Without privatization of telecommunication entities, ecommerce ventures will not succeed, or certainly will not move
187
forward to satisfy the potential demand.
In fact, given the move

179. Alan C. Swan, The Dynamics of Economic Integration in the Western Hemisphere:
The Challenge to America, 31 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000).
180. For example, Argentina privatized by presidential decree 731/89, in
accordance with Law 23.696, named Ley de Reforma del Estado. See Celani, supra
note 174, at 14.
181. See García Jiménez, supra note 162, at 92 (explaining the privatization process
in several Latin American countries).
182. See id. at 92 (comparing various models and methods of privatization). The
concessions included a condition of exclusivity for seven years, which could be
extended for three more years if certain conditions of investment and quality were
met. See Celani, supra note 174, at 14.
183. Such reasons would be set forth in the concession contracts. See García
Jiménez, supra note 162, at 93 (describing typical conditions in telecommunications
privatization contracts).
184. For example, Argentina’s privatization process was mismanaged, lacked
transparency, and was unpredictable.
Moreover, the privatization contract
established that the benefit received by the companies could not exceed 16% of the
invested capital. See Celani, supra note 174, at 14; García Jiménez, supra note 162, at
94 (discussing Argentina’s problematic transition to privatization of its
telecommunications industry).
185. See Bjorn Wellenius, Extending Telecommunications Service to Rural Areas—The
Chilean Experience, PRIVATE SECTOR, Feb. 1997, at n.105 (noting that about 1.5 million
Chileans do not even have a public telephone and around 500,000 won’t be able to
afford a telephone connection).
186. See Buck, supra note 128 (discussing concerns associated with the
development of international e-commerce and advocating a development policy
focused on private sector competition).
187. See Baucus, supra note 171, at 208 (discussing the relationship between
telecommunications privatization and new forms of economic development). U.S.
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toward privatization in the last two decades, the laws and regulations
in Latin America have continued to protect the telecommunications
monopolies and have prevented expansion of services in the region;
188
changes in the legal terrain are moving forward only grudgingly.
Some countries may have sufficient laws and regulations to bring
about change, but there is a significant lack of oversight and zeal in
the industry because those with oversight powers are weak and easily
189
manipulated.
Among Latin American countries, only Chile has succeeded in
190
Under the 1994
opening the sector to full competition.
telecommunications law there was no restriction on foreign
191
ownership of telecommunication companies.
This resulted in an
192
In 1999,
increase in telephone penetration and in lower rates.
government regulations had “forced rates down by 70%, with the
193
average cost for 20 hours falling from $55 to $15.”
Many countries that have privatized have yet to be fully liberalized,

Senator Max Baucus explained that opening up telecommunications to competition
is key to reducing the cost of Internet access, thereby increasing the number of
potential electronic buyers and markets. Id.
188. Countries like Brazil need significant legal groundwork and public
commitment for liberalization and privatization to take place.
The two
administrations following military rule, Collor and Cardoso, unsuccessfully took a
liberalization campaign to reform the markets and the telecom industry. Brazil’s
telecommunications monopoly was mandated by the Constitution and by the
Telecommunications Code of 1962. Only in 1988, after numerous bills and fights
was the state telecommunications giant, Tebras, privatized. Also, liberalization and
deregulation of certain markets have since benefited the procurement of telecom
equipment. Having finished with policies for protecting Brazilian industries, the
government terminated the market reserve for large switching systems, and allowed
the importation and fabrication of optical fibers. See Antonio Jose J. Botelho et al.,
supra note 171 (outlining the history and development of Brazilian
Infrastructure, at
telecommunications); see also Doing ebusiness in . . . Brazil:
EBUSINESSFORUM.COM, Sept. 26, 2000.
189. For example, this is the case of Cofetel in Mexico and Anatel in Brazil.
Analysts comment that companies seeking to invest in data transmission in the
region (by renting or laying cables for fiber optic installations) should be cautious of
the lack of oversight there is in the telecommunications industry in Latin America.
See Lisa K. Wing, Utilities Take a Byte, LATINFINANCE, Apr. 2000, at 32 (describing the
difficulty of managing a business in a deregulated market and warning that many
companies may not have the management means to operate in the
telecommunications market).
190. See Loveridge, supra note 159 (reporting on the progress of
telecommunications privatization in several Latin American countries). See also
Walter Molano, The Forces of Privatization: The Privatization of Chile’s Telephone Industry,
4 NAFTA: L. & BUS. REV. THE AM. 120, 121 (1998) (discussing the political history of
the privatization of Chile’s telephone industry).
191. See Loveridge, supra note 159 (comparing Chile’s telecommunications
regulatory regime to those of other countries).
192. See id. (illuminating the effects of Chile’s privatization process). For
example, telephone penetration in 1997 jumped from 7 per 100 inhabitants to 12
per 100. Id.
193. Faiola & Buckley, supra note 136.
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as the trend has been to convert a public monopoly into a private
194
monopoly. This occurs when the government sells the state-owned
monopoly and gives a new private operator the exclusive right to
provide local and, sometimes, long distance service for a designated
195
time period.
The result of this type of privatization is that the
affordable service that would evolve through competition fails to
196
develop.
Some of the barriers to the growth of e-commerce must be resolved
by the governments of Latin America. Argentina continues to
tolerate a monopoly for Internet access. Because of the monopoly
the cost of high-speed net access in the country is prohibitively
expensive, between fifty to one hundred times the cost of such
access in the United States. To make a phone call from Buenos
Aires to Rosario it is cheaper to call through New York! On the
other hand, the recent privatization of the state-run phone
company in Brazil is expected to lead to reduced telephone
charges and better infrastructure service in that country, helping to
197
accelerate the growth of e-commerce.

Great demand for new and cheaper “technologies challenge the
198
existing powers and their exorbitant, non-cost based rents.”
Changing the laws and regulations to allow and assure service
providers the opportunity to offer services is crucial to a healthy
competitive market. This change has been difficult throughout the
region, and “has generated considerable opposition from labor
unions and political parties committed to maintaining the
government’s role in the provision of what are generally referred to
199
as essential services.”
The private business sector has also grown
impatient with slow moving bureaucracies.
In Argentina, Comsat, a data communications company licensed to
operate long distance service, is challenging the government’s traffic
200
rules for charging for incoming calls.
“The regulation establishes

194. See Loveridge, supra note 159 (explaining the tendency of Latin American
countries to merely privatize their monopolies rather than truly privatize their
industries).
195. This occurred in Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.
See id. (analyzing the privatization efforts of Latin American countries).
196. See id. (expounding on the disadvantage of private monopolies).
197. Jim Kolbe, International Trade and E-Commerce: Framework for the Future, 17
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 211, 217 (2000).
198. Jim Landers, Down to the Wires; Climate hampers Latin Telecom Market’s Growth,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 25, 2000, at 1D.
199. Loveridge, supra note 159.
200. See Americas, TARIFICA REG. ALERT, No. 15, Oct. 11, 1999 [hereinafter Americas]
(establishing Comsat as a major player in the telecommunications market in
Argentina, competing with companies such as Impsat, Telecom Soluciones, and
Advance Telecomunicaciones).
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that the dominant operator charge the incoming call the same price
201
Comsat argues that an independent
as an end customer.”
infrastructure is needed to remedy this burden on long distance
202
telecommunications services, and industry experts note that a
monopoly on telecommunications obstructs innovation and
competition, keeps access costs high, and prevents improved
203
services.
Argentina telecommunications regulation has long been
fashioned on classifications for licensing telecommunications
carriers. This system has proven hostile to a competitive industry and
may be responsible for the high costs “as well as the slow
204
Argentine consumers can only
development of the Internet.”
access the Internet by dial-up modem “for a monthly fee, which, in
some cases, permits access for only limited duration and at restricted
205
times,” even though new technologies provide users with other ways
to connect to the Internet.
These new methods are not
contemplated by the operators of Argentina’s national
telecommunications network, who claim that the innovations are not
“controllable by its regulators” and are “erod[ing] the foundation on
206
which the current regulatory system rests.”
At any rate, new rules for regulating telecommunications and
Internet services were proposed and are set to be in place by
207
November 8, 2000.
These rules “pretend” to fully liberalize the
208
industry and establish only one type of integrated license. But two
months before the complete liberalization of the telecommunications
markets is set to occur, the new rules necessary to regulate the market
209
are yet to be in place.
In Brazil, the matter of competition and corporate ownership has
disrupted growth of e-commerce projects. Current Brazilian law does

201. Id.
202. See id. (reasoning that interconnection creates a barrier to companies trying
to enter the telecommunications market).
203. See Latin American Gold Rush, supra note 59 (arguing that Latin American
Internet penetration will remain low until a low-cost, easy-to-use access device exists).
204. See Kenneth R. Carter, et al., Internet Services and New Regulations in Argentina,
LATIN AM. L. & BUS. REP., Aug. 31, 2000, at 2 (noting that the Argentine
telecommunications regulations are outdated and hinder competition).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See id. (noting that on June 2000 the President issued Decree 450/00 and
Presidential Instructions to review the proposed rules regarding regulation of
telecommunications and Internet services in Argentina, specifically regulation of
carrier licensing, network interconnection, and universal service funding).
208. See id. at 23 (delineating the three types of licenses created by the licensing
regime of 1999: telephony, telecommunications and Value Added Services (VAS)).
209. See id. at 24 (concluding that the new Argentine rules have not been
established in time for a successful liberalization of the telecommunications market).
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not allow one company to hold positions in competing companies.
Such is the case with the disallowed merger of MCI and Sprint.
Sprint owns 25% of Intelig in association with France Telecom and
the British National Grid. Intelig is the long distance carrier
planning to start up operations by end 1999 in direct competition
with Embratel, which is 100% owned by MCI. The partners paid in
January $55 million Reals for the license to compete with Embratel
210
and outlined plans to invest $2.8 billion Reals in infrastructure.

Given the restriction of the law, some analysts believe Sprint is left
with three choices: (1) pull out from Intelig, (2) bring in the
telecom agency Anatel to monitor the operations of both Sprint and
211
Embratel, or (3) terminate the license for Intelig or Embratel.
There is an additional element at play in Brazil’s plans to privatize
the telecommunications sector, one with strong nationalistic and
212
protectionist tendencies that appear to fly in the face of GATT, the
213
214
World Trade Organization (“WTO”), and Mercosur agreements.
In 1995, the telecommunications sector became subject to
215
constitutional amendments, when Constitutional Amendment No.
8 of 15 August 1995 mandated that concessionaires or
permissionaires of public services no longer need to be state-owned
216
companies. The amendment created a situation such that “in order
to protect the economic and financial health of state-owned
companies, the government had to act very prudently in defining the
process for the granting of licenses, since these companies [would]
have to live within a new competitive environment, never before

210. Americas, supra note 200.
211. See id. (stating that Brazilian law does not permit a company to hold positions
in competing companies).
212. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] (providing the basic rules of the multilateral
trading system that controlled from January 1, 1948 until the World Trade
Organization (WTO) became effective on January 1, 1995). See also GATT 1994:
What Is It?, at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/eol/e/wto02/
wto2_4.htm#note1 (last visited Jan. 16, 2001) (exploring the provisions of the GATT
1947 agreement).
213. See GATT 1994: What Is It?, supra note 212 (outlining the agreement that
established the WTO, an organization that provides a multilateral and integrated
trading system).
214. Mercosur is a trading bloc comprising the nations of Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay. For more information on Mercosur, see Mercosur, at
http://www.idrc.ca/lacro/investigacion/mercosur.html (last modified Dec. 23,
1998).
215. See Fabio F. Kjawski & Eduardo de Cerqueira Leite, Brazil: New Regulatory
Framework for the Granting of Licenses in Telecommunications, at http://www.natlaw.com/
brazil/topical/cm/spbrcm/spbrcm1.htm (visited Sept. 17, 2000) (according to a
report issued by Baker & McKenzie on the firm’s website).
216. See id.
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217

experienced by them.”
However,
in
August
1999,
the
Brazilian
National
Telecommunications Agency put in place a new rule, Resolution 155,
setting forth a set of procedures and requirements for “hiring services
218
or acquiring equipment by telecom services providers.”
The
requirements are such that preference for equipment and contacting
services must be shown to domestic suppliers and expertise first
before products and services can be solicited from international
suppliers and contractors. “Generally, the preference must be
granted whenever the price conditions, delivering term and quality of
Brazilian equipment or service are equivalent to the same equipment
219
or service provided by a non-Brazilian company.”

217. Id.
218. Fabio de Sousa Coutinho & Luciano Costa, The New Ruling for
Telecommunications Services Providers in Brazil to Acquire Equipment or Hire Services, at
http://www.bakerinfo.com/Publications/Documents/1152_tx.html (visited Sept. 17,
2000) (a report issued by Baker & McKenzie on the firm’s website).
219. Id. The requirement, in either the Concession Contract or the Authorization
Term, is basically the same, and can be translated as follows:
Clause n—In hiring services or acquiring equipment and material related to
the service which is the object of this contract (or term), the Concessionaire
(or Authorized Provider) is obliged to consider offers from independent
suppliers, including national ones, and base its decisions, with respect to the
various offers presented, in compliance with objective criteria of price,
delivering conditions and technical standards established in the pertinent
regulation.
Paragraph 1—In cases in which equivalency in the offers exists, the
Concessionaire/Authorized Provider is obliged to use as decisive criteria the
preference for services offered by companies located in the Country,
equipment and material manufactured in the Country, and, within this
group, those with national technology. The equivalence referred to in this
clause will be verified when, simultaneously:
I) the national price is lower or equal to the imported price added to all
taxes for importation;
II) the delivering term is compatible with the service needs;
III) the technical standards established in the pertinent regulation are met
and certification issued or accepted by ANATEL is present, when applicable.
In order to guarantee compliance with such requirements, the Resolution
establishes the following procedure for any acquisition or contract estimated
in excess of R$ 1,000,000.00 (roughly U.S.$ 500,000):
(i) the telecom provider must announce, for no less than 5 days, in its
homepage, an intention to acquire equipment, material or services and
where any interested supplier located in Brazil may find the information
needed to make an offer;
(ii) ANATEL must be notified of the outcome of such public announcement
within 10 days, which are counted from the date the supplier is chosen.
ANATEL must also be advised as to the criteria used to select the chosen
supplier.
Any supplier that believes it has been discriminated against by the telecom
providers’ decision may file a complaint before ANATEL. If the noncompliance with the Resolution is confirmed, the telecom provider is subject
to pecuniary fines up to R$ 30 million (roughly U.S.$ 15 million).
Articles 7 and 8 of the Resolution grant ANATEL extensive access to all the
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There have been suggestions that Resolution 155 is the result of
political and nationalistic concerns with the need to stimulate
national industries and maintain employment, particularly as Brazil
emerges from one of the country’s longest and harshest economic
crises. But the resolution was not popular.
Even before its enactment, the Resolution faced strong reaction
from telecom providers, particularly huge telephone operators.
This is due to the fact that many of the concessionaire companies,
since the privatization process of the Brazilian telecommunications
sector, have had international telecom suppliers of equipment or
service participating in their equity composition, or have also had
220
robust business relations with such international companies.

Those who contest the Resolution argue that competition in the
Brazilian telecom market will be highly damaged by being isolated
from world markets. In this scenario, most technologically innovative
products and services would not reach the Brazilian market. In
addition, the lack of secrecy in the business relations between
suppliers and telecom providers that may result from use of the
Resolution procedures may be harmful to the commercial strategies
of telecom services providers. Indeed, there is a delicate political
issue behind the enactment of the Resolution: the governmental
policy of seeking development of Brazilian industry and technology
221
in the telecommunications sector.
Finally, in Mexico, the Federal Communications Commission
222
223
224
(Cofetel) has pressured Telmex, which privatized in 1990, to

documents and records related to the acquisition of equipment and services,
in order to allow the agency to verify compliance with the Resolution
provisions.
It is important to note that, in order to prevent abuse of the right to
complain described above, the Resolution determines that, if the accusation
of discrimination is declared false more than once, or if it is used to obtain
any irregular advantage or to delay the formalization of the execution of a
contract, its author should be required to reimburse ANATEL for the
administrative expenses in examining the case.
Id.
220. Id.
221. See id.
222. Cofetel is Mexico’s telecommunications watchdog. It is independent from
the Secretary of Communications and Transportation (SCT). Although the SCT is
the principal regulatory authority in granting concessions, Cofetel actually makes the
decisions to adjust telecommunications tariffs because the SCT generally adheres to
See Mexico Telecommunications Update, 1999,
Cofetel’s recommendations.
INFOAMERICAS, 1999, available at http://www.infoamericas.com. Together, the SCT
and Cofetel work to secure operating environments, encourage competition, look
after implementation of interconnection rates, and promote non-discrimination in
the choice of service providers, among others. Id. Since April 1998, Cofetel was
granted the additional responsibility of “overseeing the aperture of the long distance
market.” Id. Currently, Cofetel is also overseeing the “local, cellular, satellite,

NAGLEPP.DOC

892

10/10/2001 11:04 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:859

increase tariffs on long distance services in order to recover
telecommunications losses, again posing a hindrance to stimulating e225
This action by Cofetel is due
commerce infrastructure expansion.
in part to pressure by the United States to break Telmex’s hold on
the telecommunications market in which Telmex has a 90% share—
even after competition in the long-distance market was introduced in
226
1997.
Cofetel has a long history of failing to properly regulate Telmex.
227
But Cofetel, which has a reputation for being “a paper tiger,” is not
alone in Latin America for poor oversight of the telecommunications
industry and allowing telecommunications conglomerates carte
228
blanche to do what they want to do.
Under threat of the United
States pressing a lawsuit filed with the WTO, Cofetel recently
determined that Telmex would have to change its inter-connection
229
fees on costs. “Telmex was given a deadline of mid-October to lay
230
Cofetel also
out these new, cost-based interconnection tariffs.”
directed that Telmex “would have to maintain uniform local service
231
charges across the country until 2003.” Analysts were quick to note
that any changes in pricing or impact on opening the market to
232
competition would be minimal.
Telmex has long been the seven hundred pound gorilla, and has
resisted any attempts to loosen its hold on the industry, using Cofetel
as a foil to deflect most challenges to its near monopoly. Telmex, for

microwave (both point to point and point to multipoint), the radio electric
spectrum, cable television, paging and trunking.” Id.
223. “Telmex” is Telecommunications of Mexico, a privately owned company that
is 49% foreign-owned by South Western Bell and France Cable & Radio and is 51%
owned by Grupo Carso. Telmex is the dominant long distance provider in Mexico.
Under Mexican law, all long distance providers in Mexico must be majority Mexican
owned. See id. (describing the various players in the Mexican telecommunications
industry).
224. See Pablo Garibian, Mexico’s Telecom Regulator Reins in Telmex, REUTERS, Sept.
12, 2000 (defining Telmex as a former government monopoly that was privatized in
1990).
225. See Americas, supra note 200 (expressing that Telmex’s competitors have
called upon Cofetel to raise prices as a means of reducing their losses).
226. See Pablo Garibian, Mexican Regulation Changes Will Have Minimal Impact,
REUTERS, Sept. 12, 2000.
227. Id.
228. See Wing, supra note 189, at 32 (“In a number of Latin American countries,
the government regulates power companies while there is no oversight in the
telecommunications industry.”).
229. See Garibian, supra note 226 (referring to a lawsuit commenced by the U.S.
Trade Representative against Mexico alleging a lack of government action to open
the market).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See id.
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instance, has up to now gotten away with not lowering the $2.61 per
minute interconnection rate imposed on its competitors in the long
233
Moreover, Cofetel has allowed “Telmex to
distance market.
increase its long distance rates by 14.16% and its local rates by
234
4.07%.” Telmex also possesses a license for national distribution of
235
cellular service, and controls 65% of that market.
Telmex’s actions and Cofetel’s complicity have not gone unnoticed
by world regulatory and trade bodies. In 1999, the Organization for
236
Economic Co-Operation and Development (“OECD”) found that
Mexico’s phone charges were twice the organization average while
the number of telephone lines for every 100 inhabitants was among
237
the lowest in Latin America. Citing Telmex’s high interconnection
rates and unfair practices, OECD criticized Mexico for its failure to
238
According to
reach teledensity of 20 lines per 1000 inhabitants.
OECD, “Telmex need not be compensated for the interconnection
rate decrease as it saw in 1998 a $1.6 billion profit gain, while its two
largest competitors—Alestra and Avantel—saw combined losses of
239
$450 million.”
Furthermore, price increases to the consumer
240
gained Telmex an additional $814 million in revenues in 1999.
Cofetel justifies such revenue increases by saying that “these increases
241
are still well below the rate of inflation.”
This behavior by Telmex and Cofetel prompted the United States,
AT&T, MCI, and Southwestern Bell to file a lawsuit before the WTO

233. See Mexico Telecommunications Update, 1999, supra note 222 (noting that the
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development’s Communication
Outlook 1999 criticizes Mexico’s failure to increase competition against Telmex).
234. Id.
235. See id. (explaining that Telcel, a subsidiary of Telmex, has a high market
share of the cellular market due to the market’s partially closed nature).
236. See What is the OECD?, at http://www.oecd.org/about/general/index.htm
(last visited Nov. 16, 2000) (describing the OECD as a twenty-nine country
organization that facilitates the perfection of social and economic policy on a global
level).
The OECD groups 29 member countries in organization that, most
importantly, provides governments a setting in which to discuss, develop and
perfect economic and social policy. They compare experiences, seek answers
to common problems and work to co-ordinate domestic and international
policies that increasingly in today’s globalised world must form a web of even
practice across nations.
Id.
237. See Landers, supra note 198 (examining an OECD report that recognizes
Mexico’s lagging telephone line availability).
238. See Mexico Telecommunications Update, 1999, supra note 222 (criticizing the
government’s lack of regulation as the cause for Mexico’s failure to advance in the
telecommunications industry).
239. Id.
240. See id.
241. Id.
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charging that Telmex has systematically and with government
collusion stifled competition in the telecommunications markets in
242
Washington has accused the Mexican government of
Mexico.
shielding Telmex from competitors and has alleged that doing so
243
prevents U.S. companies from moving into the market. Part of the
conflict has to do with Telmex’s refusal to grant lines to companies
that, according to Telmex, have refused to pay millions of dollars for
244
long distance connections. The United States claims, however, that
the high rates charged by Telmex for access were designed to drive
out competition. Under WTO rules for telecommunications trade,
the going rate for circuits should be set on a cost-based fee. However,
Telmex charges its foreign competitors “19 cents a minute for circuit
245
access that costs Telmex only 6 cents a minute.”
Under the regulatory and legal environment that exists in Mexico,
it is difficult for Cofetel to exercise its authority, as Telmex has used
the court system to prevent Cofetel from exerting its authority over
246
Telmex.
In fact, Telmex has won “more than 200 injunctions
247
against the regulatory agency.”
The seven hundred pound gorilla
continues to lumber along.
To encourage competition in the telecommunications industry,
Mexico must give Cofetel more autonomy and authority to regulate
248
Even with privatization,
the telecommunications industry.
“Mexican consumers pay nearly four times as much as U.S.
249
consumers for a basket of telecommunications services.”
To
promote liberalization the Mexican government must also make the

242. See Diego Cevallos, Trade-Mexico/U.S.: Telecoms Dispute Goes Before WTO, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, July 28, 2000.
243. See U.S. to Request WTO Consultations With Mexico Regarding Telecommunications
Trade Barriers, at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2000/07/00-57.html (last visited Nov.
16, 2000) (outlining the issues regarding prohibitive Mexican telecommunications
practices that the U.S. government would like the WTO to resolve).
244. See Landers, supra note 198 (explaining that U.S. telecommunications firms
complain that Telmex will not supply circuits for dial-up Internet access when
requested).
245. Id.
246. See id. (reporting that U.S. trade officials blame the lack of control over
Telmex’s monopoly on Cofetel’s inability to effectively “referee”).
247. Id.
248. “President-elect Vicente Fox has said he will ensure that Cofetel has both the
autonomy and authority to regulate Mexico’s telecommunications companies.” Jim
Landers, Down to the Wires: Climate Hampers Latin Telecom Market’s Growth, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, July 25, 2000, at 1D.
249. A study by the Alexis de Tocqueville Institution found that in the United
States, 2,000 minutes a month of local calls, national and international long-distance
and unlimited Internet access cost under $45. The same package in Mexico costs
more than $160. See id.
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right policy decisions to promote foreign investment. Failure to do
so diminishes customers and services. For example, in 1999, when
petroleum revenues were low, the Mexican government tried to
compensate for the lost revenue by assessing a 15% tax on local and
long distance services, in addition to the 15% value added tax that
was already in place, causing Mexican consumers to pay for losses in
an unrelated sector of the economy for no other reason than that the
symbiosis between the government and monopolies closely tied to the
251
government allows such behavior to occur.
Privatization does not necessarily equal relief from monopolies and
lower prices from new competition. Under circumstances such as
exist in Mexico, lower prices are not going to be seen by consumers
because right now the companies are passing the marketing costs on
252
to the consumers in order to confront the competition.
To encourage development of the telecommunication sector in
any type of technology, wired, wireless or fiber optic, Latin American
governments must establish a clear and transparent regulatory system
which allows government agencies to become more authoritarian and
253
responsible for providing reasonable access to the market.
Companies may have expertise in the technologies, but they could
continue to have risk aversion if the regulatory framework remains
254
uncertain. For instance, in order to “create ubiquitous broadband,
[Latin American countries] must create transparent, effective
regulatory regimes that ensure full competition . . . This means that
regulators inevitably must curb the power of powerful incumbent
255
carriers to create a level playing field for new entrants.”

250. See Landers, supra note 198 (explaining that although the Latin American
market is ripe for foreign investment, fear of a non-competitive marketplace have
kept many investors away).
251. See Mexico Telecommunications Update, 1999, supra note 222 (noting that long
distance companies have been upset about the tax because they feel it is contrary to
the concept of deregulation).
252. See Pablo Bachelet, Más Competencia, Precios Iguales, AMERICAECONOMIA, June 1,
2000, at 12.
253. See Latin American Gold Rush, supra note 59. Latin America lacks the
backbone for Internet traffic that was built in the United States where different
Internet service providers connect to that backbone at different access points. Id.
For a user in southern Chile to access “a site in Ecuador, the traffic will go all the way
from Chile to the U.S. and then back to Ecuador. To remedy this problem, several
companies are building undersea fiber optic cables that connect Latin America with
the U.S.” Id.
254. See Landers, supra note 198 (noting that without a firm regulatory regime to
ensure competition, Mexico will continue to fall behind other nations in
telecommunications technological advancement).
255. Id.
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C. Logistical Barriers
E-commerce operators “are especially frustrated by a lack of service
256
and support from traditional logistics firms,” noting that high
shipping costs, slow and poor service, and delivery coverage that is
257
limited to metropolitan areas hinder the growth of online business.
Moreover, the problem is further aggravated by “protectionist and
258
bureaucratic customs officials and a lack of modern infrastructure.”
1.

Distribution and delivery systems
Anyone who has ever attempted to ship a package to a Latin
American destination knows that shipping is expensive, mostly
259
inefficient, and often unreliable. “Restrictions on certain goods are
imposed by courier company policy, by the laws of the destination
country and by the airlines that handle the cargo, if the courier does
260
not operate its own fleet.”
Shipping costs in the region are
significantly higher, time in transit is longer, and the procedures
entail more inconvenience than shipping over the same distances in
261
U.S. markets. Moreover, the process is so unreliable that businesses
and services do not accept payment by mail. This high cost,
unpredictability, and a lack of responsibility to the client are mainly
“due to government red tape, the cumbersome collection of taxes
262
Another factor is
and duties, and difficulties in returning goods.”
corruption and theft by postal and delivery workers and malaise of
Latin Americans who seem to accept it. Whereas delivery may be
offered free of charge in B2B purchases in the thousands of dollars,
the cost to deliver goods in transborder B2C transactions, which
average under $100, may be so high in proportion to the price of the
263
item bought that it is not cost efficient to buy online.

256. E-commerce and Logistics—A Reluctant Marriage Takes Hold, INFOAMERICAS, June
2000, available at http://www.infoamericas.com/Tendencias/General/0600/
0600.pdf [hereinafter E-Commerce and Logistics] (describing the logistics industry as
comprising carriers, airlines, trucking firms, freight forwarders, and customs agents
such as Federal Express, and the United Parcel Service).
257. See id. (lamenting online business’s lack of delivery options for nonmetropolitan Latin American areas).
258. Id.
259. See Vanyi-Robin, supra note 74, at 103 (explaining that shipping logistics have
long been a problem in Latin America due to an unreliable postal service and the
high cost of private parcel services).
260. E-commerce and Logistics, supra note 256.
261. See Dismantling the Barriers to Global Electronic Commerce, at
http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/it/ec/prod/DISMANTL.HTM (last modified Oct. 16,
1997) (noting that although online shopping is convenient, offline shipping is costly
and inefficient).
262. Id.
263. See Latin America B2B E-Commerce—A Promising Future, supra note 26 (offering
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For example, in the United States, a reader can log onto
Amazon.com and receive a $5 book within three days for $4. For
an Argentine resident, it could take 12 weeks or cost nearly $40.
Yet, Yenny.com, one of Argentina’s largest online bookstores, can
264
deliver a book to an Argentine resident for $6 in three days.

It is said that Latin America “suffers from an acute case of Reliable
265
Distribution Disorder.”
While a cross-border transaction may
proceed without incident, there is genuine concern that merchandise
266
Furthermore, the carrier at the origination
may be lost in transit.
point may not be the same carrier at the terminus. Whereas
businesses purchasing online have the advantage of customs brokers
working for them to shepherd goods through the shipment pipeline,
most private consumers have little experience with the system and no
267
such access to brokers or import permits.
The situation is
frustrating to the major carriers in Latin America, who view increased
business with B2C clients “as a nuisance rather than an
268
opportunity.”
For one thing, nearly one-third of on-line orders placed by
consumers contain data entry errors compared with only 10% to
15% of B2B orders. Tracking down the business customer to verify
the data is also far easier than with consumers. B2B delivery is also
much simpler. Courier companies typically require an average of
about 2 visits to a household to complete a delivery compared with
1.2 visits for a business. These problems translate into higher costs
and more hassles for a much smaller slice of the total courier
269
business.

Even experienced shipping companies encounter significant
hurdles to delivering merchandise to customers in Latin America.
“In Brazil and other countries, companies like UPS with its hallmark

a comparison of the payment and delivery methods of B2B commerce and B2C
commerce).
The average purchase is in the order of roughly $70, but logistics costs can
raise the client’s bill to as much as $150. At those rates, B2C purchases are
limited mainly to hard-to-find items bought by the upper classes. As a result
logistics costs are preventing B2C vendors from challenging traditional
consumer good distribution channels.
E-commerce and Logistics, supra note 256.
264. See John Kennedy et al., Internet Goes South, And So Do Investors, NAT’L L.J.,
Jan. 24, 2000, at C8.
265. Weisman, supra note 79.
266. See id. (explaining that once an order has been placed on the Internet and
the payment has been authorized, the merchandise often does not arrive).
267. See Latin America B2B E-Commerce—A Promising Future, supra note 26 (noting
that businesses have more safeguards than average consumers to assure the delivery
of goods they purchase online).
268. E-commerce and Logistics, supra note 256.
269. Id.
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door-to-door tracking and delivery have to pass the client to someone
else for local service because laws in those countries don’t allow a
single company to handle the cargo through the whole logistics
270
chain,” and even then, some couriers will not deliver to private
271
This contracting/subcontracting process between
residences.
carriers raises the cost and reduces the reliability of delivery for goods
272
purchased online.
As a consequence, a number of Latin American e-commerce startups that are selling internationally have jumped to Miami, where
American international couriers are better able to track and deliver
273
merchandise back to Latin America as promised, when promised.
Some international shipping firms have attempted to fix the holes in
the distribution chain. An example of this is DHL, which has
undertaken to improve service by building a new hub in Argentina to
handle the delivery of goods resulting from e-commerce
274
transactions.
Even if the delivery apparatus is put in place to better serve ecommerce customers, the shipping of products across borders can
still be slowed or terminated by the rigid nature of civil law systems
275
and customs regulations.
Often goods are stopped in transit
“because a signature doesn’t match or there is a document [that]
276
contains a minute error,” or a bribe is required to move the process
277
forward. This snafu can result in a package being returned to the

270. Document Devils: There’s More to Shipping Goods in Latin America Than Just
Getting Them There, LATIN TRADE, Jan. 8, 2000 [hereinafter Document Devils](reporting
information obtained from Dale Hayes, vice-president of corporate development and
the head of e-commerce for United Parcel Service).
271. See Latin America B2B E-Commerce—A Promising Future, supra note 26
(lamenting the lack of shipping services for non-commercial purchasers of online
goods).
272. See eMarketer July 1999, supra note 4, at 177.
273. See generally Antony Currie, Miami Spice, EUROMONEY, Mar. 2000, at 124
(discussing Miami’s growth as a home to international banks and Internet start-ups).
274. See Logistics, MERCOSUR TRADE & INVESTMENT REP., Nov. 1999, at 11.
[DHL] plans to invest $19 million over the next two years in Argentina to
expand its operations . . . The investment will enable the company—which is
owned by Deutsche Post, Japan Airlines, Lufthansa and private investors—to
offer next day delivery between Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay
(the Mercosur countries) and 24-hour delivery to and from the U.S.
Id.
275. See Document Devils, supra note 270 (reporting on a study which states that
documentation and taxation problems account for half of the stopped shipments in
Latin America).
276. Id.
277. According to a ship captain interviewed, “paperwork is often a ruse for
seeking a bribe. At the very least, customs and immigration officials expect a
complimentary bottle of top-shelf bourbon or whiskey. Forget the booze and you
better be ready for delays.” Id. As a former Colombian judge, the author can
confirm first-hand that such practices routinely take place. It is as if bribery is built
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sender or permanently misplaced.
Another quagmire arises when new regulations take effect without
prior notice to the shipping industry.
You never know when the documentation problems may throw a
wrench into the logistics chain. Port authorities in Buenos Aires
one time delayed a ship belonging to Brazilian company Grupo
Libra for days because it didn’t have a new crew registration
document that was only made a requirement in Argentina that very
279
week.

If a new apparatus is installed to ship goods via e-commerce that
circumvents the opportunity for officials to enrich themselves, it is
reasonable to anticipate that delays in receiving goods purchased
online will result. But few solutions appear on the horizon. Brazil
has taken great strides to improve customs operations at major
shipping and transit centers in the country. Dell Computer saw
enough improvement to risk opening a plant in Brazil in 1999, and
the International Air Transport Association reviewed customs house
operations in Brazil and noted significant improvement in customs
clearance rates of freight and cargo. Yet, according to one freight
forwarding executive, “[t]he performance of each of the customs
280
officers depends very much on the (chief) customs inspector.”
Another executive in the industry agrees, noting that customs in
Brazil can get the job done right, however “it is so inconsistent. My
clients ask me the average time and when I tell them that it can take
281
one day or it can take 10, they just look at me.”
The following anecdote by a reporter who hired a freight
forwarder to ship his belongings from Brazil back to the U.S.
illustrates the challenges awaiting an e-commerce company in Latin
America:
I signed forms that basically constituted a contract, as well as a
power of attorney to take control of my things. My goods, I was
told, should arrive within the week. A little more than two weeks
later, customs demanded that I supply notarized copies of my
passport, visa, Brazilian residence card, plane tickets and exit

into the legal system.
278. See P. Howlett, Latin American E-commerce: Get Online or Perish, IDG NEWS
SERVICE (Latin America Bureau), at http://www.idg.net/idgns/1999/06/07/
LatinAmericaEcommerceGetOnlineOr.shtml (June 7, 1999) (discussing the “general
lack of faith in the delivery of goods in Latin America”).
279. Document Devils, supra note 270.
280. Michael Fabey, Relativity: An International Team Looking At Cargo Trouble Spots
Has Surprising Things To Say About A Well-Known Choke Point, AIR CARGO WORLD, Aug.
1, 1999, at 24 (quoting Jose Olyntho Machado, Jr.).
281. Id. at 24 (quoting Beat Simon, country manager for Danzas, a Swiss
forwarder).
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card . . . . A month later, another call. My power of attorney had
expired; I needed to sign and send down another one. I, of course,
did. Two months passed. Another call. Another problem. This
time I was told that the signature of my initial forms did not match
the later signatures, nor did they match those on the official
signature card I had filled out in São Paulo. After almost half a
282
year, I still had not received my goods.

Latin America is very strict, formalistic and inflexible in regard to
283
following procedures “to the letter.” This is particularly true about
forms and paperwork, and the Circle Group, a logistical consultant
company, offers courses to companies “to teach them how to fill out
the right documents and properly. According to the company, many
284
of the shippers leave the course with their jaws dropped.”
Yet, even with high or inconsistent delivery of goods and the
challenge of overcoming the rigidity of civil law systems, market
analysts, such as the Giga Information Group, are “predicting that
corporations around the world will save up to $1.25 trillion by 2002
by doing business over the Internet. Companies conducting both
285
external and internal activities online can save millions of dollars.”
To any entrepreneur, this is a potent incentive to press forward,
making the risks in the distribution chain worth taking. Moreover, in
a region where the costs of conducting international business
transactions are traditionally quite high, conducting business through
e-commerce could significantly widen the profit margins of even
286
small businesses in Latin America.
Companies with something of a handle on distribution obstacles
are making themselves attractive to e-commerce ventures by
marketing their regional shipping expertise. StarMedia brought to
its venture with Hewlett-Packard an expertise in shipping through its
287
Sky Box Services, an innovative logistics solution.
The service

282. Document Devils, supra note 275.
283. R. Lemos, Brazil, in General Questionnaire, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 23, 25
n.4 (2000). “[I]t can be stated that [the] Brazilian Legal System is predominantly
formally-attached, and innovative responses from courts to new questions such as
electronic commerce issues invariably take some time to occur. Such formalism is
rooted in an excessive attachment to old-fashioned legal doctrines.” Id. Likewise,
Colombians recognize that the legal culture is characterized by excessive formalisms.
See F. Reyes, Columbia, in General Questionnaire, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 23, 98
(2000).
284. Document Devils, supra note 275.
285. Foreword, Technological Edge Supplement, supra note 101.
286. See Michael Fabey, Servicio: Faster Freight Needs Are Driving Investment In Express
Service Across Latin America, AIR CARGO WORLD, Nov. 1999, at 23 (reporting on why
American shippers in Latin America are increasingly courting small and medium
sized companies).
287. See Mary Hillebrand, HP Puts E-Commerce to Work in Latin America, E-COMMERCE

NAGLEPP.DOC

2001]

10/10/2001 11:04 AM

E-COMMERCE IN LATIN AMERICA

901

enables Latin Americans to have purchases from U.S. websites
shipped to a U.S. address for customized handling. “Sky Box then
carries them south and delivers them to homes and offices, bypassing
288
often unreliable local carriers.”
Another shipping industry firm, the Miami-based online service
289
From2.com, helps ease the fears of businesses eager to expand into
Latin America by calculating shipping and customs charges based on
290
From2.com
the merchandise, value, weight, and package size.
“demystifies the complexity associated with foreign customs issues,”
logistics, and added costs by providing quotes to customers of the
291
total costs before purchasing.
The company frees the merchant
from the responsibility of knowing the importation laws in the
country in which the goods are shipped and guarantees the quote
given at no charge to the merchant “if the merchant uses
292
From2.com’s shipping services.” The company also maintains sales
293
tax exemption records.
Still, hundreds of smaller cities in Latin America, with populations
exceeding 200,000, are unable to benefit from the delivery services
294
offered by the major shipping companies, and government postal
295
services are “erratic at best.” As a result, these customers are forced
296
to depend on “small and unreliable companies to fill the gap.”
At times, the only reliable national delivery system belongs to the
soft drink and potato chip manufacturers that stock the bodegas
and mom-and-pop stores that do business in almost every
297
community, no matter how small or remote.

TIMES, (Sept. 10, 1999) at http://www.ecommercetimes.news/articles/9909105.shtml (describing HP’s belief that the Sky Box initiative will increase HP’s ecommerce business in Latin America 300 times over).
288. Anthony DePalma, Getting There is Challenge for Latin America E-Tailing, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 2000, at C4.
289. See From2 Global Solutions, at http://www.from2.com/english.index.htm (last
visited Nov. 15, 2000) (offering global e-commerce solutions which facilitate
international trade).
290. See From2.com Breaks Down The Barriers Of International E-Commerce, at
http://www.from2.com/english/prcontent.asp?articleID=43
(June
30,
1999)
(explaining how the company’s “Global Cost Calculator” overcomes shipping
problems).
291. See id. (demonstrating how the company is able to navigate through complex
issues).
292. Id. (explaining the benefits a company derives from using from2.com’s
technology and know-how).
293. See Hillebrand, supra note 287.
294. See E-commerce and Logistics, supra note 256 (noting that “the leading courier
firms continue to regard the . . . [small firms] as a nuisance rather than an
opportunity”).
295. See DePalma, supra note 288, at C4.
296. E-commerce and Logistics, supra note 256.
297. DePalma, supra note 288, at C4.

NAGLEPP.DOC

902

10/10/2001 11:04 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:859

The dilemma remains not how much money is to be paid on
insurance, tariffs, and taxes for transborder shipping, but how to
physically deliver the purchases. The major international shipping
companies like UPS, FedEx, and DHL are anticipating the expansion
of e-commerce into Latin America.
We liken the status of the Internet in Latin America to being where
the United States was in 1996,” said John Menna, vice president at
U.P.S. for marketing for Latin America and the Caribbean. “It’ll
take about four or five years to start seeing anything substantial
develop there. Nonetheless, U.P.S. is putting in place all the pieces
and the infrastructure to facilitate electronic commerce and the
298
buying and selling of goods throughout Latin America.

As part of the long-range plans of UPS, the company recently
purchased Challenge Air Cargo, a Miami-based air cargo company
299
serving Latin America, and is in the process of expanding a cargo
hub in Viracopos, Brazil to accommodate Mercosur distribution
300
chains. “[T]he acquisition provides landing rights in virtually every
developed country in Latin America, a process that could have taken
301
years had it been negotiated nation by nation.”
With the rights,
UPS is now offering “day-definite service five days a week to Central
America with dedicated round-trip flights between Miami and San
302
Jose, Costa Rica, the budding Silicone [sic] Valley of the region.”
Some countries such as Brazil, Mexico, and Peru have been
thinking about solutions, following the lead of Argentina and
303
Ecuador, which have already privatized the mail service. The move
in Brazil, however, has drawn concern from the express carrier
companies operating in the region that privatization would place the
postal services in direct competition with express carriers, and that
new regulations would bring international carriers under domestic
authority. DHL executives assert that the Brazilian postal service
intends to exert control over the express carrier industry “and extend
304
its monopoly. It’s a very hot issue.”
In the end, the success of e-commerce ventures in Latin America
comes down to the ability of retailers and distributors to move goods
internationally, and for consumers to acquire goods without undue

298. Id.
299. See id. (noting that UPS strengthened its Latin American operations by
adding more airplanes and routes from Miami to Latin America).
300. See Fabey, supra note 286, at 23.
301. DePalma, supra note 288, at C4.
302. Fabey, supra note 286, at 23.
303. See E-commerce and Logistics, supra note 256 (noting that these countries believe
a privatized mail service will create a wide network as well as competitive pricing).
304. Kevin G. Hall, Express Carriers Attack Brazil Taxes, J. COM., Oct. 28, 1999, at 1.
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tax and tariff hardship. Notes UPS vice-president Dale Hayes, “No
matter how much technological expansion is taking place, a seamless
web for trading goods and services is meaningless—and in the end,
305
unattainable—without a seamless network for transporting them.”
D. Regulatory Barriers: Customs, Tariffs, and Taxation
There is no question that the growth of e-commerce has until quite
recently been slowed by cross-border customs obstacles and the
accompanying tariffs and taxation.
The lack of uniformity
throughout Latin America as to standard prohibitions of certain
goods can prove a daunting barrier for transnational e-commerce,
particularly when the consumer is in one country surfing the Internet
and makes a purchase from an online company in another country.
The consumer may make the purchase and not realize that the goods
paid for are not allowed in his or her country. A standard list of
prohibited goods includes the following:
[INSERT TABLE 1]

Used with permission from Infoamericas.com


305. Moving Toward a Streamlined, “E” Latin America, BUS. WIRE, May 16, 2000.
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The following is an example of specific prohibitions in Argentina,
Brazil, and Mexico:
[INSERT TABLE 2]]

Used with permission from Infoamericas.com
Most e-commerce business advocates resist customs duties and
taxation on international e-commerce transactions. “[C]yber-space
should remain duty free. Just as in the world of international trade in
goods, tariff barriers imposed on electronic commerce will stifle
306
Brazil has
competition and impede efficiency and innovation.”
been under significant pressure from express shipping companies to
reduce or remove heavy taxes on expedited shipments, which the
shippers claim “discriminates against their mode of transportation
307
and robs shippers of efficienc[y].”
Brazil, the largest economy in Latin America, imposes a flat 60%
tax on the declared value of goods arriving in Brazil via Federal
Express, United Parcel Service and DHL Worldwide Express. The
308
tax doesn’t apply if shipments arrive by traditional carriers.

306.
307.
308.
get rid

Kolbe, supra note 197, at 218.
Hall, supra note 304, at 1.
Id. (recognizing that global package-express companies are pressing Brazil to
of its hefty tax and noting that the sixty percent flat tax is a discriminatory
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Shipping companies note that in addition to the flat tax, Brazil
309
Examples of tariffs
levies other taxes, such as value added taxes.
and taxes on computer software and hardware in the following Latin
American nations provide an indication of the costs tacked onto
transborder purchases:
[INSERT TABLE 3]

Used with permission from Infoamericas.com.
Borrowing language from the OECD regarding issues applicable to
Latin American nations, “[a] key question for governments is how the
development of electronic commerce relate[s] to the current tax
system, including substantive principles of direct and indirect
taxation, as well as increased opportunities for tax avoidance and
310
evasion, and issues of tax administration.”
Tariffs, customs duties,
and regulations have been used to protect domestic industries by
making imported items prohibitively expensive for most consumers.
However, the higher tax on those rarely acquired goods does provide
a revenue stream for Latin American nations. This is significant in
the context of e-commerce where “[o]f the online Latin American
consumers, 74% shop at U.S.-based internet sites, while only 26%
311
shop locally.”
Tariffs and disparate bureaucracies make it difficult and expensive
to buy across borders within Latin America. Moreover, customs
regulations and import tariffs vary so broadly and so often within the

practice).
309. See id. (noting that such costs ultimately are a deterrent).
310. OECD Policy Brief No. 1 Nov. 1997 on Electronic Commerce, at
http://www.oecd.org/subject/electronic_commerce/documents/emergence.htm
(July 6, 2000) [hereinafter OECD Policy Brief No. 1].
311. eMarketer March 2000, supra note 113, at 236.
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region as to make the cost of doing transborder business irregular
312
and unpredictable.
“It is clear that consistent approaches at [the] international level
are urgently required to ensure the effectiveness of taxation laws in
313
During the WTO meeting in Seattle in
this new environment.”
1999, “several first-world panelists urged a permanent ban against
314
customs duties on services for goods sold over the Internet.”
The
WTO’s position at present is a temporary tax moratorium for its
315
member nations.
One Chilean analyst advocates a 5 percent
transaction tax, split evenly between the buyer and seller, the idea
being that e-commerce gains would be spread more equally
throughout the free-trade environment still being defined under
316
Mercosur. Meanwhile, banks and investors, impatient to move into
the e-commerce arena in Latin America, are putting pressure on
governments not to interfere with e-business investments and
ventures. Nonetheless, some Latin American governments have not
responded well to pressure from the private sector to loosen customs
laws and tariffs, thereby ensuring some resistance to the
relinquishment of state control over commercial infrastructure.
The Mercosur trading bloc has established customs regulations
that have made expedited transborder delivery of goods as express
shipments more reasonable.
The value limit on the express
shipments in Brazil was recently raised “from $500 to $3000 for
317
imports and from $3000 to $5000 for exports.”
However, there is
still no minimum value, thus “if a company sends a small gift such as a
318
$15 compact disc, it would be charged at 88% of that value.”
Many corporations looking to expand e-commerce services into
Latin America would like to see nations in the region embrace
uniform regulations and standards and remove domestic barriers
imposed by customs regulations and taxation. Among others,
Microsoft and other Business Software Alliance members have called
for e-commerce to be regulated under trade rules set forth in both
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the intellectual
319
property provisions of the WTO.

312. See id. at 238.
313. OECD Policy Brief No. 1, supra note 310.
314. Buck, supra note 128.
315. See id.
316. See id. (quoting Alfredo Barriga).
317. Fabey, supra note 286, at 23.
318. Hall, supra note 304, at 1 (noting that despite the no-minimum value,
package-express companies would like to see a minimum value between $50 and
$100).
319. See George Leopold, Racks up $3.5B in Software Sales; E-commerce to Drive
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E. Security
Latin Americans tend to be distrustful of businesses, banks and
320
financial institutions, and the government.
Their wariness comes
from long traditions of institutional corruption and unethical
321
business practices.
Concern over the security of e-commerce
transactions is cited as the single most important problem for Latin
Americans, although a few analysts will argue that this is not as much
322
an issue for consumers as it is for businesses and banks.
As a
general rule, Latin American consumers do not provide credit card
numbers over the phone; most credit card transactions are
performed face-to-face and almost always require a physical
323
signature.
Given this longstanding practice, Latin Americans are
hesitant to relinquish a credit card number into the void of
cyberspace. For those Latin American customers willing to purchase
online with credit cards, most are stopped “by a dearth of both secure
324
Consequently,
links and automated payment system software.”
many Latin American companies have someone monitoring the Web
325
site for transactions.
If a purchase order is received with only a
credit card number, a worker at the company’s site will manually
enter the credit card number into a credit card terminal for
326
authorization.
For instance, a successful Argentine online bookstore, Librerias
Yenny, accepts credit card numbers over the Internet through an email request, but the order is processed off-line. The site “encrypts
327
all the customer’s information and validates it on-line.”
However,
the final transactions are made outside the virtual environment at the

Growth, ELEC. ENG’G TIMES, Oct. 11, 1999 (noting the goal of members “to encourage
consistent approaches to online trade”).
320. For an interesting discussion of ethics in the region, see Business Ethics in
Latin America, LATIN AM. ALLIANCE, at http://www.latinsynergy.org/latameri.htm
(visited Sept. 9, 2000).
321. See id. (advocating that the most significant challenge of business ethics in
Latin America is the elimination of corruption).
322. See Vanyi-Robin, supra note 74, at 103; see also Howlett, supra note 278
(discussing obstacles to e-commerce in Latin America).
323. R. Nogueira & L.H. Ventura, Brazil, in General Questionnaire, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 23, 91 (2000) (quoting Ricardo Nogueira, who acknowledged that “the
principle factor that could be regarded as an obstacle to the development of ecommerce transactions in Brazil is insecurity.”); see also Otero, supra note 61, at 95
(stating that Chilean consumers are skeptical about the security of online payments
and the lack of consumer protection against fraud or failure to deliver the products
purchased online).
324. Weisman, supra note 79 (noting that Argentina’s credit card penetration level
of thirty percent is the highest of all Latin American countries).
325. See id.
326. See id. (illustrating the difficulties associated with simple transactions).
327. Collazo, supra note 1.
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time the order is processed. “The customer usually signs the receipt
328
upon delivery of the goods or sends a fax with the authorization.”
This off-line method renders the process a non-e-commerce purchase
if one follows the strict definition that “[t]rue e-commerce occurs
when an entire transaction from search to purchase can be
329
completed without leaving the computer.”
Regardless of the
definition of the type of transactions taking place, Librerias Yenny
has crossed over from the brick and mortar business into the world
cyber market, establishing a second website with international
330
presence in the United States, Mexico, and Spain.
Assuming many e-purchases in Latin America are made through
U.S. companies insisting on the use of a credit card to complete the
deal, some analysts think e-commerce in Latin America is actually
being hindered by requiring credit cards to complete transactions.
There is also a problem with U.S. credit card processing services not
recognizing foreign MasterCard and Visa card numbers or retailers
331
simply not accepting them.
Credit card fraud is so widespread in the region that “many people
332
Understandably,
still queue at the bank to pay bills in person.”
Latin Americans are hesitant to use or accept credit cards for online
transactions with no general standard in place to effectively verify the
identity of e-commerce parties or assure secure transactions. Part of
their hesitation is based upon the notion that “[e]lectronic
commerce applications can be secure only if they operate in a
business environment with adequate controls of physical, financial,
333
and computer resources.”
A survey conducted in Argentina by
Prince & Cooke showed that even with explosive growth in Internet
use, “43.6% of Argentine new users would not purchase goods online
334
due to fears over payment security.”
In Brazil, however, Banco
Bradesco has teamed up with a group of local banks and Visa credit

328. Otero, supra note 61, at 96.
329. Giraldo Gutierrez, Real Electronic Commerce; Coming Soon to Latin America,
LATINFINANCE, Sept. 1998, at 38.
330. See Mary A. Dempsey, Vuelta a la Hoja, LATIN TRADE, June 2000, at 54.
331. See Jo Cooper, City: That’ll Do Nicely—I Don’t Think, SUNDAY TEL. (London),
May 7, 2000, at 5 (recognizing that foreign credit cards are routinely checked for
security verification, but noting some merchants reject the cards rather than follow
through with the security verification process).
332. eMarketer March 2000, supra note 113, at 237 (“Latin Americans have an
even greater concern about credit card fraud than Americans and Europeans.”).
333. BENJAMIN WRIGHT & JANE WINN, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 3-1 (3d
ed. 1999) [hereinafter WRIGHT & WINN] (noting the difficulty in maintaining
information system security).
334. Warn, supra note 100 (explaining that there are still obstacles to the
development of e-commerce).
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card to take the lead in promoting e-commerce through an online
335
shopping site, and has eased security concerns for consumers.
Latin American governments must implement legislation to protect
336
consumers’ data and privacy.
Given the maxim that “[c]omputer security cannot be guaranteed
337
or proven,” the task of e-commerce companies in the region will be
to educate and assure Latin Americans that reasonable precautions
have been taken to safeguard the electronic business transaction
338
process.
Clearly, Latin America can benefit from efforts by the e-commerce
industry in first world countries, which, for nearly a decade, has been
attempting to define clear strategies for secure transactions based on
established principles and guidelines such as those issued by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and the Financial
339
Account Standards Board.
Mostly, e-commerce security should be
the result of these common-sense practices identified by the National
340
Research Council in 1991:
• Quality control. The design of a system must be appropriate to
provide the functionality it is intended to supply even before
security concerns are taken into account.
• Access control on code as well as data. Every system must have
the means to control which users can perform particular
operations.
• User identification and authentication. Every system must have
the means to ensure that any user is properly associated with
the correct system identifier.
• Security logging. Every system must have the means to log for
later audit all security-relevant operations on the system,
including improper attempts to access the system and
protection of the log to prevent it from being deleted or

335. See Howlett, supra note 278 (noting consumers’ desire for guaranteed security
of credit card information); see also Vanyi-Robin, supra note 74, at 103.
336. See Nogueira & Ventura, supra note 323, at 91. One model Latin American
countries could follow would be the OECD Consumer Protection Guidelines to: (1)
control fraudulent and misleading commercial conduct; (2) resolve disputes and
establish redress mechanisms; and (3) ensure on-line consumer privacy. See OECD
Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic Commerce, at
http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/it/consumer/prod/guidelines.htm (last visited Sept.
20, 2000).
337. WRIGHT & WINN, supra note 333, at 3-2 (noting the security of physical assets
that is assured through industry standards).
338. See General Questionnaire, supra note 68.
339. See WRIGHT & WINN, supra note 333, at 3-2 (providing a clear articulation of
essential security features).
340. See id. (explaining the elements of generally accepted system security
principles).
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altered after being written.
• Security administrator. All systems must have a special class of
user who is permitted to modify the security state of the system
according to standard procedures.
• Data encryption. Any networked system must have a method of
encrypting confidential or sensitive communications.
• Independent audit. An independent, unannounced audit of
the system and its administration, analogous to an annual
business audit by an accounting firm, should be conducted.
• Hazard analysis. A hazard analysis must be done for every
341
safety critical system.
During that same year, the Internet Engineering Task Force
provided a guide for Internet users by recommending the following
procedures to secure online transactions:
Looking at what you are trying to protect;
Looking at what you need to protect it from;
Determining how likely the threats are;
Implementing measures which will protect your assets in a costeffective manner; and
Reviewing the process continuously, and improving things every
342
time a weakness is found.
Not long ago, the International Chamber of Commerce created a
Global Action Plan that can serve as a model for Latin American
governments to follow in order to alleviate consumer security fears.
Among the issues addressed in the Plan are: protection of personal
information; consumer empowerment; marketing and advertising
ethics; and issues relating to confidentiality and lawful access to
343
information.
There are a number of solutions that are both currently available
and emerging to calm Latin American consumers skittish about
credit card transactions over the Internet. One method is the use of
passwords and personal identification numbers (“PIN”), which is an
inexpensive form of providing security in e-transactions. “The
common failure by users to implement password systems properly,
344
however, creates a very real security threat.” As a further safeguard,

341. See id. (citing to the work undertaken by the Site Security Policy Handbook
Working Group of the Internet Engineering Task Force in 1991).
342. See id. (recognizing that the members of the task force point out that selling
security policies and procedures really means developing a plan for dealing with
computer security).
343. See J.A. Avellan, ICC, in General Questionnaire, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 23,
99 (2000).
344. WRIGHT & WINN, supra note 333, at 3-14.
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PIN numbers and passwords could be compiled into a database
managed by a third party.
Also, the re-engineering of credit cards is showing positive results.
In Chile, banks are introducing credit cards for use in online
transactions that “contain different security mechanisms, special data
345
Likewise, in
encryption, and purchase limits to ensure safe use.”
Brazil, some financial institutions have established alternate payment
mechanisms, including “the electronic wallet, smart cards . . . and the
346
virtual credit card designed specifically for online purchases.”
347
Direct debit or smart cards, first developed in France in 1974 and
used extensively in Europe, may provide another solution to
consumers who fear using credit cards online. “Circumventing credit
card use for e-commerce purchases opens up a much wider potential
348
user pool,” much as pay-and-use phone cards have created a new
market for long-distance calling. “In a standard protocol, the smart
card generates a message containing the user’s name and password,
encrypts the message, and transmits the encrypted message to a
349
central authentication server for authorization to access.”
The
introduction of smart cards into the B2B and B2C online arena is led
by banks who see the security advantages of storing digital signatures
or certificates on a smart card instead of storing them on a PC’s hard
350
drive, which would render the certificate susceptible to hackers.
Bank of America, like other financial institutions such as Deutsche
351
Bank, Citibank, Chase Manhattan, and Barclays Bank,
has
established an authentication services firm called Identrus. Identrus
has created “an international registry of sorts for trustworthy ecommerce entities. Indentrus would provide a one-stop, third-party
352
safety check,” and security would be protected by a rule that
353
Identrus digital certificates “must reside on smart cards.”
IBM is also bringing into the market e-commerce products such as
Vault Registry digital certificate software and the CommercePoint

345. Jose Luis Donoso, IT Developments, 15 COMPUTER L. ASS’N BULL. 28 (2000).
346. Vanyi-Robin, supra note 74, at 103.
347. See WRIGHT & WINN, supra note 333, at 3-14 (discussing the invention of the
smart card, its subsequent use in Europe, and its potential use in the United States).
348. Collazo, supra note 1, at 48, 50.
349. WRIGHT & WINN, supra note 333, at 3-14 to 3-15.
350. See Donald Davis, B2B Gets Down to Business, CARD TECH., Feb. 2000, at 30, 36
(discussing the consortium of international banks focused on the use of smart card
technology).
351. See id. (listing the various banks which participate in the consortium).
352. Buck, supra note 63 (discussing information provided by Elizabeth Ghekiere,
Bank of America senior vice president).
353. Davis, supra note 350, at 30, 36.
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354

payment product, which will provide Latin American e-commerce
businesses with more secure means to conduct electronic
transactions. One industry analyst notes that if Internet retailers put
the fears of consumers to rest and provide easier access to highquality goods than traditional brick and mortar retailers, the e-market
355
in Latin America will succeed.
This success will result, if for no
other reason than wealthy Latin American consumers will not have to
356
go to Miami to shop.
Given the difficulties associated with B2C transactions, analysts
believe that e-commerce in Latin America will be driven more by B2B
357
This is because B2B transactions are forecast to
transactions.
outpace other types of “online activity in terms of dollar volume of
358
goods and services transacted.”
One significant hurdle for Latin American e-commerce businesses
to overcome is the very high cost of establishing public key
infrastructure (“PKI”) and smart card services. PKI technology can
359
run as high as $30 million for a individual company to implement.
Also, the smart cards themselves can cost U.S.$8 to U.S.$24,
360
In
“depending on how much other functionality is required.”
addition, the smart card readers installed on PCs are pricey, between
U.S. $30 and U.S. $50 each. Moreover, the consulting costs to get the
system up and running can be very high. Regardless, the cost may be
well worthwhile if the end result is to secure the legality of binding
contracts in an electronic marketplace.


354. See Carlos Pirez, IBM Talks up E-commerce in South America, THE STANDARD, June
11, 1998, at http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151,616,00.html
(discussing the role IBM intends to play in Latin American E-commerce).
355. See Warn, supra note 100 (discussing the rapid growth of internet start-ups in
Argentina).
356. See id.
357. See Vanyi-Robin, supra note 74, at 103 (“B2B e-commerce is expected to grow
at much higher rates than B2C, increasing to an estimated $6.1 billion by 2003,
whereas online spending by consumers will hit $1.9 billion that same year, according
to IDC.”).
358. See id.
359. See Davis, supra note 350, at 36 (noting that bids to set up PKI systems can run
between 15 and 30 million dollars).
360. Id.
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III. LEGAL CHALLENGES
Legal changes to adopt and embrace e-commerce are rapidly
implemented in the United States, where industry lobbyists and
consumers affect legislation, where commercial custom is a source of
law, and where judges keep pace with changes in industry and
361
On the other
commerce through their interpretations of the law.
hand, Latin America has been slow to implement new legislation to
accommodate e-commerce. The region has yet to see consumers and
lobbyists influence legislation, and custom is “at best a secondary
362
source of law.” In addition, judges in Latin America are limited to
following the letter of the law as set forth by their respective
legislatures.
While all regions of the developing world struggle over the best way
to regulate e-commerce, Latin America’s concerns extend beyond the
mere implementation of new laws and regulations. How electroniccommerce should be regulated in each Latin American country is
and will be crucial to the success or failure of this new way of
conducting business transactions. Resolving this issue goes to the
heart of the civil law tradition: the sanctity of forms and the
363
requirements of traditional writing and signature. Latin America’s
new legislation governing e-commerce must effectively address a
proper legal framework for the development of electronic markets.
The changes must include adapting to the evolving networked
infrastructure, diminishing or ending the government’s dominance
and control that curtails the consumer’s power, and creating more
flexibility for judges as interpreters of the law.
Latin American nations have proposed and enacted laws and
regulations, in addition to issuing decrees regarding electronic
documents, digital signatures, certification authorities, tax
procedures, and amendments to existing civil and commercial code
provisions with the goal of strengthening the language of the laws to
embrace commercial and contractual obligations in the electronic
364
environment. However,

361. See O.T. Johnson, U.S.A., in General Questionnaire, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
23, 30 (2000) (confirming that, in the United States, “consumer demand is pushing
e-commerce forward, and the law will simply have to catch up.”).
362. Issues Paper, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 5, 13 (2000) [hereinafter Issues
Paper]; see also General Questionnaire, supra note 68, at 23-30.
363. See Issues Paper, supra note 362, at 11 (noting the traditional dependence
upon tangible documents and signatures in Latin American culture).
364. For example, Mexico’s initiative is to reform its Civil Code, Articles 1, 1803,
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the individual efforts of individual countries lack the strength and
effectiveness associated with regional or international guidelines or
initiatives. The proliferation of different rules may not only hinder
harmonization efforts but also restrict or delay the acceptance of
new e-commerce technologies when such regulations are not
365
technology neutral.

Substantive and procedural conflicts domestically and between
countries have failed to facilitate a proper environment for electronic
commerce. This creates a complex and unpredictable environment.
A. Formality of the Legal System
The impact of e-commerce on the Latin American legal tradition
has been to challenge its historical formalism and lack of
366
adaptability.
Latin American legal systems inherited from the
Roman-Germanic tradition the predominance of written law over any
367
form of custom and judicial interpretation.
Concern with legal
certainty drives Latin American countries to implement laws

1805, 1811, and add Article 1834. Mexican lawmakers also plan to reform the Code
of Civil Procedure and Commercial Code by revising Articles 18, 20, 21 (1st
paragraph), 22-27, 30-32, 49, 80, 1205, and adding Articles 20, 21, 21.1, 30, 30.1, and
32.1298-A. See La Firma Digital.com, at www.lafirmadigital.com/legislacion/america/
mexico/at1.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2001); see also La Firma Digital.com, at
www.lafirmadigital.com/legislacion/america/mexico/at3.htm (last visited Mar. 10,
2001); The National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade, at http://natlaw.com/
ecommerce/docs/e-commerce-initiative-mexico.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2000)
(detailing proposed modifications to Mexico’s Commercial Code).
365. See Issues Paper, supra note 362, at 15.
366. See International Chamber of Commerce, GUIDEC—General Usage for
International Digitally Ensured Commerce, at http://www.iccwbo.org/home/
guidec/guidec.asp (last visited Sept. 21, 2000) (“The historical and currently
perceived function of formalities has an important effect on their adaptability to
electronic commerce. The advent of electronic commerce has challenged, and will
continue to challenge, the validity of these formalities.”).
367. See Issues Paper, supra note 362, at 11, 25 (“Latin America’s transactional
laws, . . . are still heavily influenced by the nineteenth century civil code policy.”); see
also Francisco Reyes Villamizar, Electronic Commerce: Recent Legal Developments in
Colombia, Oct., 2000 at 3 [hereinafter Developments in Columbia] (conference paper on
file with author). Furthermore, judges are not prone to judicial interpretation.
Merryman, writing about judges states:
An extreme separation of the dogma of strict separation of the legislative
and judicial powers was the notion that judges should not interpret
incomplete, conflicting, or unclear legislation. They should always refer
such questions to the legislature for authoritative interpretation. . . . The net
image is of the judge as an operator of a machine designed and built by
legislators. His function is a mechanical one. The great names of the civil
law are not those of judges (who knows the names of a civil law judge?) but
those of legislators (Justinian, Napoleon) and scholars (Gaius, Irnerius,
Bartolus, Mancini, Domat, Pothier, Savigny, and a host of other nineteenthand twentieth-century European and Latin American scholars).
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL
SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 36 (2d ed. 1985).
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regulating every imaginable move or transaction, to require written
documents to evidence every business deal and simple affair, and to
require handwritten signatures to ascertain the identity of the parties
368
Coincidentally, the perplexing formalities of Latin
involved.
America’s civil law traditions challenge the entrepreneurial spirit of ecommerce enterprise.
To the common law-trained observer, Latin America’s exaggerated
369
The
preoccupation with legal formalism is at times astounding.
formalism is such that the amount of written documents, signatures,
and stamps required to conduct commercial transactions presumes
“that every citizen is lying unless he produces written, documentary
370
proof that he is telling the truth.”
Pre-existing laws and rules pertaining to commercial custom and
course of dealings hamper e-commerce in the region. Given the
nature of the technology that feeds e-commerce (namely the
inherent speed and high customer involvement), commercial custom
and the parties’ course of dealings ought to be the accepted norm.
However, in Latin America commercial custom is a subsidiary source
of law that is applied and legally binding only in the absence of
371
written statute, and when it does not contradict existing law.
In
practice, commercial custom or course of dealings “are rarely
372
applied.” Under the Latin American legal tradition, the judge will
usually find a written statute regulating party obligations for two
reasons.
The Civil Code and Commercial Code regulate party obligations.
The Civil Code regulates general issues like principles of obligations,
contract formation, and capacity. The Commercial Code is more
specific because it regulates all matters related to commercial
373
transactions and merchants.
Therefore, when dealing with any
commercial issue, the Commercial Code must be applied first. If this

368. See generally Issues Paper, supra note 362, at 11 (discussing the legal formalities
imposed upon transactions in Latin America); see also Developments in Columbia, supra
note 367, at 3.
369. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & DAVID S. CLARK, COMPARATIVE LAW: WESTERN
EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS: CASES AND MATERIALS 387 (1978); see
also F.H. LAWSON, THOMAS COOLEY LECTURES, FIFTH SERIES, A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS
AT THE CIVIL LAW (1953) (discussing the historical differences between common law
and civil law).
370. MERRYMAN AND CLARK, supra note 369, at 387.
371. See General Questionnaire, supra note 68, at 24-30 (citing various panelists’
responses regarding the legal implications of customs in Latin America).
372. Lemos, supra note 283, at 25.
373. See id. at 31 (explaining that under the inherited French or Roman-Germanic
legal system, Latin American countries divide the issues covered by the Civil or
Commercial Code but recognizing that “despite theoretical divisions, the line
between . . . civil and commercial laws has been effectively blurred.”).
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In the
code is silent on the issue, then the Civil Code applies.
absence of statutory regulation of the issue, commercial custom and
course of dealings would apply. Due to this “low hierarchy, one
rarely finds claims based on customary law” in Latin American
375
courts.
Because proving commercial custom is difficult and cumbersome,
and because the party alleging commercial custom has the burden of
376
proof, a court will consider a commercial custom to be binding if
“it has been recognized by at least two judicial decisions or duly
377
certified by the local chamber of commerce.”
Also, a commercial
custom will apply if it does not conflict with commercial law, and the
facts that constitute the custom are uniform, public, and “repeated
over a long period of time” in the place where the obligation is to be
378
fulfilled or where the relations to be regulated arose. Because it is
difficult to provide evidence on customary law, lawyers generally
379
prefer to base their claims on statutory law.
“The impact on e-commerce is self evident. Courts will remain
reluctant to enforce claims based on commercial customs and course
of dealing. Also, parties will rarely base claims on customary law
because of the unlikelihood of a favorable decision and the evidence
380
requirement.”
There are a number of contract formalities that must be observed
as well. For the creation of a right, the law requires certain contracts
to be finalized in written form, while other contracts require writing,
notarized documents and registration, and authentication by
381
handwritten signature.
Thus, any e-transaction taking place in
countries that have yet to enact e-commerce legislation may prove
382
unenforceable.

374. See Developments in Columbia, supra note 367, at 4 (“This legal duality is
troublesome in the specific field of contracts, due to the existence of duplicity of
regulations for many private agreements. The assessment of the applicable
substantive regime is usually difficult and often characterized by subjective
definitions.”). Developments in Columbia, supra note 367, at 4.
375. Lemos, supra note 283, at 26.
376. See id.
377. Reyes, supra note 283, at 28.
378. See Otero, supra note 61, at 27; see also Developments in Columbia, supra note
367, at 3 (noting Article 3 of the Colombian Commercial Code, which addresses the
conflict between commercial law and commercial custom).
379. See Lemos, supra note 283, at 26 (explaining the difficulties involved with
trying to make custom legally binding).
380. Id.
381. See Oscar M. Becerril, Current Law in Mexico With Respect to E-Commerce, 17
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 131, 141 (2000) (noting that in Mexico, a country based on
written law, all transactions must be properly documented to be enforced).
382. See id. at 141-42 (discussing a proposed draft in Mexico for legislating ecommerce on the Internet that would give full legal force to data transmissions and
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Many countries will not consider an electronic message to
constitute a valid document for enforcement purposes and an
383
Under
electronic signature will be considered legally invalid.
current law in many Latin American countries, electronic messages
do not constitute writing because a writing “is closely related to the
384
physical paper system.” Electronic messages can be “circumstantial
evidence of a transaction or a contract, but not as a writing in and of
385
itself.” But introducing into evidence an electronic document can
be difficult because admissibility depends on the level of secured
technology involved and whether the judge is satisfied that the
386
document is authentic.
In some countries, in order to be legally
387
388
binding, a contract must be authenticated by a notary public.
Under many legal systems in Latin America, a digital signature
389
does not constitute a signature. For a signature to validly evidence
a party’s consent it must be “handwritten and it should consist of the
signer’s name or corresponding sign executed in the signer’s usual
390
manner.”
Electronically signed documents lack “proper
391
authenticity, regardless of whether they are secured or not.” These
documents can only be authenticated in the presence of a notary
392
This forces the parties to produce the documents in the
public.
office of the notary and have all involved parties sign the documents
393
in front of the notary.

messages, which now are otherwise unenforceable).
383. See id. at 141 (stating the Mexican civil code does not consider electronic
messages to be valid documents for enforcement purposes).
384. M. Devoto, Argentina, in General Questionnaire, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 23,
36 (2000) (stating the law of Argentina regarding writing instruments).
385. Nogueira & Ventura, supra note 323, at 36.
386. But see id. (noting that “[d]ocuments signed electronically are considered to
lack proper authenticity, regardless of whether they are secured or not.”).
387. See id. at 37 (“A document is authenticated when a public notary validates the
legality of the underlying act or document. This validation renders the document
legally binding. Authentication can also mean that a document is an exact copy of
an original, including all messages and signatures, or both.”).
388. See D.C. Bunge, Argentina, in General Questionnaire, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
23, 35 (2000) (stating that notary publics are required to authenticate the text or
signatures of a contract in Argentina); see also Nogueira & Ventura, supra note 323, at
37 (noting that a notary public is required to validate the legality of a document in
Brazil).
389. See, e.g., Norgueira & Ventura, supra note 323, at 37 (illustrating that digital
signatures carry no weight in Brazil unless authenticated by a notary).
390. Devoto, supra note 384, at 36 (explaining a proposed amendment to the
Argentine civil code pertaining to written signatures).
391. Nogueira & Ventura, supra note 323, at 36.
392. See Becerril, supra note 60, at 42 (asserting that a notary public must verify
that an electronic message was received and printed in his presence to establish legal
validity).
393. See id. at 42 (stating that the only way to meet the requirement is to use the
computer of the notary public and have all involved parties sign before the notary).
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Procedurally, e-commerce encounters serious hurdles. Depending
on the type of transaction, the weight given to the evidence depends
on the amount and type of stamps, seals, or signatures put on certain
394
documents and required by the Code of Civil Procedure. It is still
uncertain how Latin American judges will handle electronic
documents. Few judges are technologically savvy. Many do not have
computers, and for several judges Internet access “could still be
395
considered a privilege,” especially outside the main cities.
Taken in the context of e-commerce invading the Latin American
business and legal landscape, “[t]here is a strong feeling that new
institutions or practices ought not be adopted without a prior law
396
authorizing them.” E-commerce has come into the region at such a
dizzying pace that Latin American legal systems have been put off
balance by the Internet revolution, and are only now beginning to
397
react.
B. Electronic Signature
Most laws governing commerce in Latin America were enacted
prior to the birth of electronic transactions. As such the laws
presently on the books in some Latin American countries do not
define adequately what “constitutes a signature in the electronic
398
environment and how certain online contracts are formed,” thus,
those nations are racing to catch up.
But what is an electronic signature? The term denotes a digitallygenerated identifier “produced through the use of public key
399
cryptography.” An electronic or digital signature is:
[p]art of a message that indicates the source of the message and
signifies that the message has not been altered in transit. The
person or thing applying a digital signature to authenticate a
document must be able easily and efficiently to affix a digital
signature, yet to prevent unauthorized use of the private key and
the risk of forgery, the signer must have a secure system to keep the

394. See Developments in Columbia, supra note 367, at 11 (noting the adherence by
Colombian legal culture to “excessive formalisms”).
395. See id. (discussing the lack of technology prevalent in the Colombian judicial
system).
396. MERRYMAN & CLARK, supra note 369, at 386 (indicating that the Brazilian legal
culture places great emphasis on seeing that all social relations are regulated by
extensive legislation).
397. See supra notes 381-385 and accompanying text (describing the varied states
of readiness in preparing for e-commerce in Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina).
398. Microsoft, Microsoft, Trade Organizations Call for Improvements to E-commerce Laws
in Latin America, M2 PRESSWIRE, Oct. 1, 1999, at 1, available at 1999 WL 24360148
[hereinafter Microsoft].
399. WRIGHT & WINN, supra note 333, at 3-19.
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How is this process accomplished? First, the sender and recipient
“must have exchanged public keys prior to sending the digitally
401
signed message.”
For a digital signature to be affixed to a message, first the signer
runs the message through the hash function to produce the
message digest. The message digest is then encrypted with the
signer’s private key, and the result is the digital signature which is
affixed to the message. Thus, the text of the message is not
confidential, but it is now accompanied by a digital signature
unique to the message that can be verified only with the use of the
signer’s public key.
The verification process takes place when the recipient of the
message uses the same hash function as the sender to produce a
digest of the message independently. The recipient then takes the
public key of the sender and decrypts the message digest from the
sender. If the two match, the digital signature has been verified. If
a digital signature is removed from the message it was intended to
authenticate and attached to a different message, or the original
402
message is modified in any way, then the verification will fail.

As some Latin American countries are in the process of enacting
laws to govern digital signatures and electronic commerce, the
challenge seems to be how “to achieve consistency across borders to
the treatment of e-commerce, and to conform to traditional freetrade principles embodied in the GATT, the GATS, and the TRIPS
403
agreements.”
Acceptance of digital signing requires addressing cultural
challenges as well as educating the user public on how to use the
technology. For instance, there are currently no regional standards
404
for private key security; however, that should change soon.
In a
recent U.S. State Department briefing, Trade Representative
Charlene Barshefsky noted progress in negotiating the Free Trade
Area of the Americas (“FTAA”) agreement slated to go into force in
405
2005.
Part of the agreement already reached includes placing on

400. Id. at 3-20 (defining digital signature).
401. Id. (describing the technical process involved in sending a digitally signed
message).
402. Id.
403. Microsoft, supra note 398, at 1.
404. See WRIGHT & WINN, supra note 333, at 3-21 (stating that no clear standards
exist on how to educate people about how they can maintain the secrecy of their
private keys).
USTR
Barshefsky
Addresses
Council
of
the
Americas,
at
405. See
http://www.usemb.gov.do/IRC/ecocom/council1.htm (May 2, 2000) (discussing
the plans to create a free trade area of the Americas by 2005).
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the Internet the various visa and customs requirements for regional
trade. Also, negotiations are underway to develop “a series of
hemispheric electronic commerce initiatives adopting such measures
406
as privacy principles and the recognition of electronic signatures.”
The priority for Latin American countries looking to regulate ecommerce would seem to be the need to address the legality and
validity of electronic signatures and security in electronic
transactions. Article 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic
407
Commerce (“UNCITRAL”) has provided a useful roadmap and
language for Latin American nations moving to define the legality of
digital signatures. The Article states:
Where the law requires a signature of a person, that requirement is
met in relation to a data message if: (a) a method is used to
identify that person and to indicate that person’s approval of the
information contained in the data message; and (b) that method is
as reliable as was appropriate for the purpose for which the data
message was generated or communicated, in the light of all the
circumstances, including any relevant agreement.
Paragraph (1) applies whether the requirement therein is in the
form of an obligation or whether the law simply provides
408
consequences for the absence of a signature.

Argentina instituted laws to govern the use of digital signatures in
409
the national public sector in 1998, and established a formal
infrastructure to regulate the use of digital signatures in official
410
government business. But Colombia’s Law 527 was actually the first
on the books to regulate digital signatures in e-commerce, followed
411
recently by Peru, which enacted its own digital signature law. Chile

406. Id.
407. In brief, the UNCITRAL model law establishes provisions governing “any
kind of information in the form of a data message used in the context of commercial
activities.” UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELEC. COMMERCE, Pt. 1, Ch. 1, Art. 1, at 3,
U.N. Doc. v. 97-22269 (May 1997) [hereinafter UNCITRAL MODEL LAW].
UNCITRAL was created in 1966 and intended to be an international body for
unifying the laws governing international trade. “UNCITRAL is based in Vienna,
Austria, and is represented by thirty-six nations from various geographic, economic,
and legal systems throughout the world. UNCITRAL accomplishes its work in part
by developing model laws and standard documents designed to facilitate
international commercial transactions.” WRIGHT & WINN, supra note 333, at 4-19.
408. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 407, at 5.
409. See Decreto No. 427 Sobre Firma Digital para el Sector Publico Argentina, at
http://www.lafirmadigital.com/legislacion/america/argentina/decreto.htm
(last
visited Mar. 10, 2001).
410. See id.
(indicating that the institution, called the Digital Signature
Infrastructure for the National Public Sector, would govern licensing, auditing, and
certification of digital signature entities).
411. See Ley 27269 de Firmas y Certificados Digitales, at http://
www.lafirmadigital.com/legislacion/america/peru/leyperu.htm (enacted May 26,
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412

has also enacted a digital signature law that “defines terms like
413
digital signature, private key, public key, and digital certificate.” At
414
415
416
this writing, Brazil,
Ecuador,
and Mexico
have proposed
legislation (proyectos) on the table, and other Latin American nations
are moving quickly toward laws to clarify the validity of electronic
signatures. The primary provision is that electronic signatures on
electronic contracts are recognized as legal and binding and satisfy
the requirements for original signatures “if their integrity and
417
authenticity can be verified by technical means.”
The admissibility of electronic records and contracts must also be
addressed in the domestic law of Latin American nations, particularly
with regard to evidence and legality. Because Latin America has been
slow to enact laws governing electronic transactions, there is still
much to be done in perfecting the legality of electronic documents,
contracts, and signatures if challenged in court. While it is true that
much of the law of contracts in civil law countries is covered under
the commercial code and civil code, the rigidity of the civil law
process poses difficult challenges to electronic commerce, not only at
the transactional stage, but also at the litigation stage, should
transactions perfected in electronic format be challenged.
The introduction of electronic commerce to the region poses new
challenges for lawmakers to redefine what constitutes electronic
evidence. The universal norm is that “[p]aper is a trusted medium
for holding legal and audit evidence. People know how to use it, and
centuries of experience have tested the application of evidence
418
principles to paper documents.”
Yet in cyberspace, “[e]lectronic

2000).
412. See Decreto Ministerio Secretaria General de la Presidenciade la Republica No. 81, at
http://www.lafirmadigital.com/legislacion/america/chile/decreto.htm (last visited
Mar. 10, 2001).
413. Donoso, supra note 345, at 28 (noting that the law applies only to
government documents and administrative procedures).
414. See Dispõe sobre o comércio eletrônico, a validade jurídica do documento
eletrônico e a assinatura digital, e dá outras providências, available at http://
www.natlaw.com/ecommerce/docs/e-commercebill-brazil.htm (last visited July 17,
2000).
415. See Proyecto de ley de comercio electronico, firmas electronicas y mensajes de
datos, available at http://www.corpece.net/servicios/proyectos/ley_comercio_
electronico.htm (last visited July 17, 2000).
416. See Decreto Por El Que Se Reforman Y Adicionan Diversas Disposiciones Del Código
Civil Para El Distrito Federal En Materia Común Y Para Toda La República En Materia
Federal, Del Código Federal De Procedimientos Civiles, Del Código De Comercio Y De La Ley
Federal De Protección Al Consumidor, available at http://www.natlaw.com/ecommerce/
docs/e-commerce-iniciative-mexico.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2000).
417. Vanyi-Robin, supra note 74, at 62 (discussing the recognition of electronic
documents that satisfy the legal requirements of written documents).
418. WRIGHT & WINN, supra note 333, at 5-1.
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message technology seeks to eliminate the exchange of paper
between commercial parties and minimize the paper records each
419
retains.” Latin American legal systems are traditionally overzealous
420
in the generation, certification, and retention of legal instruments.
So, the move to electronic transactions poses difficult challenges to
the way business is done within the legal framework, most particularly
in the process of notarization of business contracts and other legal
421
instruments.
How must the commercial and civil codes of Latin
American countries be changed if the process of notarization is
removed from the electronic transactions normally perfected in the
paper world?
Article Nine of the UNCITRAL law provides sufficient language for
Latin American nations to embrace, regarding the admissibility and
evidentiary weight of electronic contracts:
In any legal proceedings, nothing in the application of the rules of
evidence shall apply so as to deny the admissibility of a data
message in evidence: (a) on the sole ground that it is a data
message; or, (b) if it is the best evidence that the person adducing
it could reasonably be expected to obtain, on the grounds that it is
not in its original form.
Information in the form of a data message shall be given due
evidential weight. In assessing the evidential weight of a data
message, regard shall be had to the reliability of the manner in
which the data message was generated, stored or communicated, to
the reliability of the manner in which the integrity of the
information was maintained, to the manner in which its originator
422
was identified, and to any other relevant factor.

C. Authentication
423

Brazil, the largest market for e-commerce, has yet to enact laws
424
specific to the validity of e-commerce transactions, relying still on

419. Id.
420. See Issues Paper, supra note 362, at 11 (“Latin America’s transactional laws,
including the laws of sales, loans, barter, transportation, brokerage, and payments,
are still heavily influenced by the nineteenth century civil code policy.”).
421. See id. at 11-13 (describing the uncertainty inherent in applying pre-existing
laws of Latin America to the uncharted waters of e-commerce).
422. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 407 (regulating the admissibility and
evidentiary weight of electronic data messages).
423. See Dawn C. Valdivia, Panel I: Report On The E-Commerce Activities Of The OAS,
ICC, ABA, and UNCITRAL, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 110, 111 (2000) (“Recent
estimates indicate that as much as eighty-eight percent of e-commerce transactions
[in Latin America] are concluded in Brazil, followed by Mexico at six percent.”).
424. See George Charles Fischer, E-Commerce Law in Brazil, 15 COMPUTER L. ASS’N
BULL. 27, 27 (2000) (“There are no laws in Brazil dealing specifically with ecommerce.”).
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formalistic and antiquated commercial and civil code statutes.
Brazil has no digital signature law, although the São Paulo Chapter of
the Brazilian Bar Association has drafted e-document and digital
426
signature legislation.
Under the current Brazilian law, the 1916
427
428
Civil Code, the 1850 Commercial Code, and the 1990 Consumer
429
Code apply to Internet transactions. However, the formalistic
requirements set forth by the codes cause problems for the
formation, validity and proof of contracts entered into in the
430
electronic environment.
Under Article Eighty-two of the Civil Code, the validity of a
contract is contingent upon the legal capacity of the parties, legality
of the object of the contract, and the form required or not prohibited
431
by law.
“Under Brazilian law, contracts need not be written or,
when written, formally signed in order to be valid and enforceable
432
(C.C., Art. 129).”
Digital or other types of secured signatures are
not enforceable under Brazilian law, although commercial contracts
entered into online “are binding as soon as the parties are in
agreement as to the subject matter of the contract, and reduce the
433
terms to writing in the case in which proof in writing is necessary.”
Subsequently,
Contracts entered into by epistolary correspondence are deemed
to be concluded and binding, as soon as the receiver of the offer
sends a reply by letter, accepting the terms of the contract
proposed without condition or reserve; up to this point the offer
may be withdrawn; except when the proposer has promised to
await the reply, and not to dispose of the subject matter of the
contract unless his offer has been refused, or until a fixed period
had elapsed. If the acceptance is conditional, it becomes binding

425. See id. (stating that Brazilian civil, commercial, and consumer laws generally
govern contracts).
426. See Anteprojeto de Lei, at http://www.natlaw.com/ecommerce/docs/ecommercebill-brazil.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2000); see also Fischer, supra note 424,
at 28 (indicating that while Brazil has no digital signature law, draft legislation is
pending before the Brazilian Congress).
427. Lei nº 3.071 de 1º de janeiro de 1916 Codigo Civil. See Fischer, supra note
424, at 27 (explaining the areas of Brazilian law that apply to e-contracts).
428. See Lei 556, de 25. de junho de 1850 Codigo Comércio.
429. See Lei nº 8.078, de 11 de setembro de 1990 Código de Defesa do
Consumidor (Brasil).
430. See Fisher, supra note 426, at 28 (suggesting that courts would likely need to
rely on technical experts to determine whether the media and form of acceptance of
an e-contract is sufficiently reliable in constituting legal evidence).
431. See id. at 27 (stating the legal prerequisites to forming a contract under
Brazilian law).
432. Id. (describing the ease of forming a contract in Brazil).
433. Código Comercial [C. Co.] art. 127 (Br.), available at http://www.cdgraf.com.br/legis.htm (visited May 23, 2001).
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as soon as the first proposer gives notice that he agrees to the
434
condition.

In an online transaction, a contract through e-mail is fully
enforceable if the relevant legal requirements and formalities are
adhered to under Civil Code, Arts. 1079 and 1086, and as long as
435
there is an acceptance of an offer.
“Thus, when a prospective
customer accesses an electronic page and places an order, a binding
436
contract between offeror and customer is created.”
Under an etransaction, the offeror and customer perfect a contract at the very
moment the customer transmits an order, “except if: (1) customer
reneges before its acceptance reaches offeror, (2) customer
undertook to await offeror’s acceptance, or (3) acceptance is not
received by offeror by the close of the term of validity of the offer
437
(C.C., Art. 1086).”
In the world of real-time Internet transactions, contracts perfected
in distance transactions are considered perfected between parties.
“As a result, failure by offeree to immediately accept an offer that
does not contain a fixed term of validity releases offeror from the
438
obligation to honor the offer (C.C., Art. 1081, I).”
439
The authority of the Consumer Code in e-commerce transactions
in Brazil protects the rights of those who would acquire goods
through Internet transactions. Brazil recognizes adhesion contracts
440
for the transaction of goods online:
An adhesion contract may be defined as a standardized contract
that the seller of a good or service offers to a customer on an
essentially “take it or leave it” basis; that is, the adhering party is not
afforded an opportunity to bargain. Although many adhesion
contracts are signed by the adhering parties, signatures are not
441
prerequisite for validity and enforceability under Brazilian law.

Brazil’s Consumer Code also provides remedies to invalidate online
contracts under certain conditions, such as if the buyer is unable to
fully review the terms of a transaction prior to acceptance, “or if the

434. Id.
435. See Fischer, supra note 424, at 27 (finding that the formation of a valid and
enforceable contract by electronic means should be possible under Brazilian law).
436. Id. (demonstrating how a valid e-contract may be formed in Brazil).
437. Id. (describing circumstances under which the parties of a contract may not
be bound to its terms).
438. Id. (illustrating the effect of finding “real-time” e-transactions to be contracts
between “present” parties).
439. See Fisher, supra note 426, at 27 (“The Consumer Code accords protection to
both individuals and legal entities that acquire goods as end users.”).
440. See id. (stating that the sale of goods on the Internet commonly involves
adhesion contracts).
441. Id.
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contractual terms are difficult to understand (Art. 46).” One way to
mitigate potential problems to the consumer, such as conducting
transactions with minors or unauthorized personnel of a business
that conducts transactions online, would be to use safeguards such as
443
encryption, digital signatures, or pre-authorization.
Notes one Brazilian legal authority on e-commerce:
[T]he most sensitive issue that a plaintiff would face if it had to
dispute an e-contract in a Brazilian court is not so much
demonstrating that this form of contracting is valid and
enforceable, but rather convincing the court that the media and
the form of acceptance of the contract are sufficiently reliable to
constitute legal evidence. To that end, the court is likely to rely on
444
the opinion of technical experts.
445

Colombia’s electronic commerce law recognizes the legality of
electronic signatures, regulates online commerce, and establishes
446
regulatory authority.
The legality and admissibility of electronic
447
contracts are recognized “and may not be denied solely because
448
they are electronic contracts.”
The issue of “presence” of parties to a contract, as noted in Brazil’s
Civil Code, is also addressed in Article 850 of the Colombian
Commercial Code, “[v]erbal proposal of a business transaction
between parties must be accepted or rejected immediately after it is
heard. A proposal made by telephone shall be assumed, for
acceptance or rejection purposes, to have been verbally made
449
between parties present.”
This law has been suitably applied in
Colombia to e-transactions, which occur in “real time.” Also, under
the law, guidelines are established for the sending and receipt of e450
mail and for verification of receipt and authorship.

442. Id. (demonstrating ways to invalidate an e-contract).
443. See id. at 28 (suggesting that the risks involved in e-contracting can be
attenuated “by the resort to codes, encryption keys, digital signatures, and certifying
authorities”).
444. Id. (speculating on the issues courts would focus on in legal disputes
involving e-contracts).
445. Ley 527 de 1999 Por medio de la cual define y reglamenta el acceso y uso de
los mensajes de datos, del comercio electrónico y de law firmas digitales, y se
establecen law entidades de certifcactión y se dictan otras dispociones.
446. See Vanyi-Robin, supra note 74, at 62 (outlining legal areas covered by
Colombia’s e-commerce law).
447. See Art. 10 of Ley 527 (1999) (Colombia’s Electronic Commerce Law),
available at http://www.natlaw.com/colombia/topical/ec/stcoec.
448. Vanyi-Robin, supra note 74, at 62 (recognizing the validity of e-contracts in
Colombia).
449. Colombia Commercial Code, Art. 850.
450. See Vanyi-Robin, supra note 74, at 62 (noting that Columbia’s e-commerce law
includes guidelines on e-mail).
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IV. EXISTING AND PROPOSED E-COMMERCE LAWS
Clearly, there remains much to resolve in Latin America’s new
frontier, and laws and regulations governing e-commerce have been
451
However, momentum is gaining
slow to appear in Latin America.
quickly to modernize the legal system to account for Internet
commerce, so much so that some of what is discussed in this paper at
452
the time of writing may be invalid by the time of publication.
Many Latin American countries are moving ahead with legislation
governing electronic commerce, using the e-commerce law drafted by
the UNCITRAL as a model for countries to establish protocols and
legal requirements conforming to a universal standard of practice
and legality in specific areas of electronic commerce such as the
453
454
formulation and validity of contracts and the carriage of goods.
Mexico has also based amendments to its Commercial Code on the
UNCITRAL model law, particularly in regard to security in e455
The Mexican law would recognize the validity of ecommerce.
contracts, especially in a court challenge, and provide for establishing
456
electronic certification and public key encryption.
Likewise,
457
Ecuador’s private sector, led by Corpece, has presented to the
458
Congress a bill to regulate e-commerce and guarantee security for
459
online transactions.
It is interesting to note that the European Union (EU) moved
assertively in the late 1990s to establish regulations and protocols for

451. See Daniela Ivascanu, Legal Issues In Electronic Commerce In the Western
Hemisphere, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 219, 219 (2000) (“Electronic Commerce in
Latin America has been slower to develop than in North America or Europe,
although recent evidence points to a steady growth in the number and value of
transactions.”).
452. See Issues Paper, supra note 362, at 13 (describing how several Latin American
countries are working to change their laws to include issues involved with ecommerce).
453. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE WITH GUIDE TO
ENACTMENT, 1996, pt. I, ch. III, art. 11, at 7, U.N. Doc. v. 97-22269 (May 1997)
(establishing guidelines on the formation and validity of electronic contracts).
454. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE WITH GUIDE TO
ENACTMENT, 1996, pt. II, ch. I, at 11, U.N. Doc. v. 97-22269 (May 1997) (regulating
electronic commerce in the area of the carriage of goods).
455. See Vanyi-Robin, supra note 74, at 62 (noting that Mexico used UNCITRAL
model laws as a guide for its proposed modifications to existing law).
456. See id. (listing key elements of Mexico’s proposed e-commerce legislation).
457. See Corporación Ecuatoriana de Comercio Electrónico (Ecuadorian
Corporation of Electronic Commerce), at http://www.corpece.net/servicios/
proyectos/ley_comercio_electronico.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2000).
458. See Proyecto de Ley de Comercio Electronico, Firmas Electronicas y Mensajes
de Datos.
459. See Vanyi-Robin, supra note 74, at 62 (discussing Ecuador’s efforts to regulate
e-commerce).
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460

e-commerce in the single market. The treatment of e-commerce in
a market bloc has significant implications for Latin America as
461
trading blocs such as NAFTA and Mercosur evolve.
On May 4,
2000, the European Parliament adopted a legal framework for the
462
Among the planks of the
development of electronic commerce.
framework are the notions that free-trade in the electronic
environment is beneficial for the region and should be pursued so as
463
to protect the tenets of fundamental freedoms, and that individual
countries must be responsible for e-commerce activity within their
own regions:
Information Society services should be supervised at the source of
the activity, in order to ensure an effective protection of public
interest objectives; to that end, it is necessary to ensure that the
competent authority provides such protection not only for the
citizens of its own country but for all Community citizens; in order
to improve mutual trust between Member States, it is essential to
state clearly this responsibility on the part of the Member State
where the services originate; moreover, in order to effectively
guarantee freedom to provide services and legal certainty for
suppliers and recipients of services, such Information Society
services should in principle be subject to the law of the Member
464
State in which the service provider is established.

At the same time, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) has advocated there be no barriers to
electronic commerce:
On the premise that new communications technologies will play an
increasing role in the economy and society and will be a key factor
in making the information society truly global, the Member
countries of the OECD have the primary responsibility to create the

460. See Council Directive on Electronic Commerce, 98/0325 (COD) 14263/1/99
REV 1, pt. 17, 9, at http://www.ispo.cec.be/ecommerce/legal/documents/
ecom_directive/composen.pdf (Feb. 28, 2000) [hereinafter Council of the European
Union] (outlining the history of Information Society Services in existing law).
461. See Issues Paper, supra note 362, at 10-11 (“Free trade treaties also play an
important role in Latin America’s embracing of e-commerce. E-commerce is bound
to grow rapidly in a region in which international trade itself has grown
exponentially in the last decade, particularly since the advent of NAFTA and
MERCOSUR.”).
462. See European Commission Information Society Directorate—General, LAW & ECOMMERCE, at http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/ecommerce/legal/legal.html#frame (last
visited Nov. 21, 2000 (providing date of adoption of the Directive on Electronic
Commerce by the European Parliament).
463. See Council of the European Union, supra note 460 (aligning the freedom of
electronic actions to the freedom of expression addressed in Art. 10(1) of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms).
464. Id. (suggesting that countries should take legal responsibility for electronic
services that originate within their borders).
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conditions under which electronic commerce can develop freely,
effectively, fairly and prosperously. Sovereign nations will need to
come to terms with the global and transfrontier nature of new
networks and communication systems and establish a coherent,
predictable, legal and regulatory framework in which global
electronic commerce can flourish. Responding to the challenges
will require broad-based international co-operation among public
and private sector entities, both from OECD Member countries
465
and, where appropriate, non-member countries.

What is notable about these two approaches to e-commerce is that
regard for personal privacy in international data communication is
466
not uniformly addressed.
For example, the EU’s Data Protection
Directive (DPD) “prohibits the transfer of personally identifiable data
to non-EU countries that do not provide an adequate level of privacy
467
protection.” At the same time, such provisions are not considered,
for instance, in the United States, which has “a piecemeal patchwork
of different statutes, regulations, and caselaw that provides widely
varying levels of protection to individuals depending on the context
468
in which the personal information is collected and used.”
The same observation might hold true for Latin American nations
as well, although it should be noted that the U.S. Department of
Commerce has tried to persuade the EU that self-regulation is “an
469
effective alternative to privacy laws” issued by a trading bloc of
470
nations. However, as Latin American economic blocs become more
entrenched, the nations involved should consider how the EU and
non-government organizations are treating the regulation of e471
commerce.
If, as has been the case in Latin America, the public
sector is slow to respond to the pace of e-commerce development due
to the inherent sluggishness of the civil law system, then the private
sector will move aggressively and push e-commerce issues onto the

465. OECD Policy Brief No. 1, supra note 312 (recognizing the emergence of ecommerce, its importance in the world economy, and the need for countries to work
together in its development).
466. See WRIGHT & WINN, supra note 333, at 4-17 (noting that the European
Union’s approach to privacy rights is directly at odds with the United States).
467. Id.
468. Id.
469. Id.
470. See id. at 4.03[D] (acknowledging that the Commerce Department has failed
to convince EU representatives of the benefits of protecting privacy with selfregulatory approaches because of the lack of effective remedies for individuals and
lack of access by individuals to personal data stored in databases).
471. See generally, WRIGHT & WINN, supra note 333, at §§ 4.01-4.05 (describing the
measures taken by the United States, the EU, and multilateral organizations such as
the United Nations and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development to establish a regulatory scheme for the future of electronic
commerce).
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472

national agenda of Latin American governments. Regardless of the
domestic policies and laws that individual countries in Latin America
create, regulation of electronic commerce in the regional
marketplace will require cross-border cooperation and formal
agreements, particularly in the areas of financial services and
business-to-business transactions.
Concerning specific types of electronic commerce, there is still
much to done in addressing such issues as securities and futures
473
trading electronically, or antitrust activities, such as electronic price
474
fixing or monopolistic trading, taking place over the Internet.
Money laundering is another criminal activity suitable to electronic
475
commerce.
How Latin America addresses these challenges, either
as individual nations, as nations embracing model laws, or through
the formation of trading blocs with a common jurisdiction, will
determine the ultimate success and indemnification of e-commerce
in the region.
Latin American nations must also adapt domestic laws and form
476
international agreements to cover criminal activity in e-commerce.
Electronic fraud, particularly in the areas of tax law, securities
regulation, and computer crime will grow in proportion to the
477
expansion of Internet commerce in the region.
Detecting and
preventing fraud and assessing and attaching liability should be
placed high on the national agendas for e-commerce legislation,
particularly as the codified laws of Latin America may in some cases
have no precedent as would be established under common law

472. See Conferences and Seminars, The Internet in Latin America: Investigating the
Boom, LATIN AM. NEWSLTRS, at http://www.latinnews.com/consem_images/
conf_internet.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2000) (insisting that the development of ecommerce in Latin American countries will depend heavily on government action,
alone or in combination with the private and non-governmental sectors).
473. See WRIGHT & WINN, supra note 333, at 11-5 (explaining that false electronic
records could cause violations of securities regulations and state corporate laws that
require the disclosure of financial reports to shareholders or government).
474. See id. at 18-4 (asserting that a potential problem in electronic markets is that
the added volume and quality of information about competitors may give rise to the
possibility of price fixing in some instances).
475. See id. at 11-2 (noting that computer processing facilitates fraud or deceit
schemes that otherwise would be more difficult if undertaken manually in
accounting books).
476. A possible model for Latin American countries is the federal Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act in the United States, which imposes criminal liability for
gaining unauthorized access into a computer related to the federal government,
financial institutions, or interstate commerce. See id. at 11-9.
477. See WRIGHT & WINN, supra note 333, at § 11.02 (explaining that whenever
companies shift from manual to automated systems, new opportunities for fraud can
arise).

NAGLEPP.DOC

10/10/2001 11:04 AM

930

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:859

478

For instance, the creation of a false record in an epractice.
commerce transaction, under the common law, would constitute
479
misrepresentation. However, there may not be a criminal provision
for such an act under the civil law of some Latin American countries.
Likewise, the securities laws of some Latin American nations may not
have provisions for situations in which false electronic records lead to
480
false reporting under a nation’s securities regulations.
There may
also be a lack of civil remedies for damages to be assessed by victims
of e-commerce crimes, particularly if the crimes involve fraudulent
481
activities or breaches of contract in cross-border transactions. The
problem again points to the issue of mutual agreements or the
adherence to a uniform law adopted by Latin American nations such
that jurisdiction will apply across international boundaries.
V. THE FUTURE OF E-COMMERCE IN LATIN AMERICA
Based on the strong demand for U.S. products in Latin America, as
well as the potential to make a great deal of money in the new Latin
American markets, private international investors are taking the
initiative in backing Latin American Internet companies and e482
commerce start-ups. Recognizable names include Bank of America
Equity Partners, Sony, and J&W Seligman (all backing Yupi.com),
Chase
Capital
(backing
MercadoLibre.com,
Patagon.com,
StarMedia.com and Viajo.com), America Online Latin America
483
(backing Español.com), and Microsoft working with Telmex. New
to many homegrown Latin American Internet enterprises is the
financing of start-ups through initial public offerings, a tried and true

478. Cf. id. § 11.04 (describing the criminal laws and civil penalties that the United
States has enforced against individuals and businesses committing electronic business
fraud).
479. See id. at 11-7 (asserting that the intentional falsification or destruction of
electronic business messages or records could implicate any number of criminal
statutes and invoke a negative inference in criminal or civil litigation).
480. But cf. Section 18 of the United States Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
(penalizing any false or misleading statements that are made in disclosure filings with
the Securities and Exchange Commission). See id. at 11-5.
481. Perhaps Latin American nations should follow the example of a provision
such as Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Act, which gives a private cause of action
in favor of investors against management and also provides the SEC the right to take
civil action. See id. at 11-6.
482. See U.S. Investors Spin the Latin Web, LATINFINANCE, Feb. 2000, at
http://www.latinfinance.com/latinfinance/magazine/feb00/1f-01.html [hereinafter
U.S. Investors] (advancing the prediction of Wall Street investment bankers that in
the year 2000, ten to fifteen Latin Internet companies could go public on the
Nasdaq).
483. See Who puts up the money? Special Reports, The Internet in Latin America:
Monitoring the Boom, LATIN AM. NEWSLTRS., Apr. 2000, at 12 (listing sources of
investment for recent projects in Latin America) (citing as source Redhering.com).
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484

venture capital strategy in the Silicon Valley. Early results indicate
that Latin American start-ups using public offerings to raise capital
485
have done very well thus far.
Forecasters predict that more than
486
fifty such companies could be trading on the Nasdaq by 2001.
Latin American start-ups that have attracted investors and gone
public are Internet portals that provide businesses with access to the
487
Internet superhighway.
The large capital Internet providers are
moving into Latin America as portals, including America Online and
Microsoft, which have formed joint ventures with Latin American
488
portal start-ups.
Despite the beating the Nasdaq sustained during
the first half of 2000, the capital raised by start-ups from public
489
offerings has been staggering.
“StarMedia Networks, the Latin
portal based in New York [City], was the pioneer issuer with its May
1999 Nasdaq IPO that raised $105 million. By the end of the year, its
490
share price had doubled.”
In September 1999, Hewlett-Packard
Company teamed up with Star Media to offer procurement and
consumer retail services with a “24-hour turnaround of online
merchant [identifications], browser-based store-building and secure
491
An Argentine portal, El Sitio, saw a
online-payment processing.”
492
150% price increase on its first day on the Nasdaq. Since then, El
Sitio has secured $44 million more in backing from General Cinema
493
Theatres and Bear Stearns investment house.

484. See U.S. Investors, supra note 482, at 19 (advancing the prediction of Wall
Street investment bankers that in the year 2000, 10 to 15 Latin Internet companies
could go public on the Nasdaq).
485. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 264 (indicating Terra Network, an affiliate of
Telefónica of Spain, held an initial public offering in November 1999 that raised
more than $10 billion in capital).
486. See U.S. Investors, supra note 482, at 19 (emphasizing that since the Nasdaq
composite index rose 85.6% last year, Internet companies as well as their backers will
hurry to bring deals to the market while the market is strong).
487. See id. (finding that in addition to providing Internet access, these portals also
include their own content and services).
488. See id. (reporting that Microsoft has teamed up with Telmex in Mexico and
Globocabo in Brazil, while America Online has a 50-50 joint venture with the
Cisneros group in Venezuela).
489. See id. (explaining that as U.S. private investors are attracted to the activity in
the dot-com area in Latin America, the Nasdaq listing provides a reliable exit strategy
to cash in their profits).
490. Id.
491. Hillebrand, supra note 287 (advancing the idea that through the “Commerce
for the Millennium” project, Latin American merchants will have the ability to host
Web stores for “reasonably low prices” and have access to StarMedia’s online
shopping community).
492. U.S. Investors, supra note 482, at 18 (explaining that El Sitio has energized
other Latin American portals to go public, e.g., Yupi, a portal based in Miami that is
America Onlines’ Latin American joint venture with the Venezuela Cisneros group).
493. See Robert Conlin, Spanish Language Portal Opens Door to $44 Million Funding,
E-COMMERCE TIMES, June 23, 1999, at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/news/
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In the United States, it appears Miami quickly is becoming a
494
primary e-hub to Latin America. At the same time, Argentina also
has established itself as an import e-hub as a result of the
deregulation of the telecom infrastructure, which resulted in
reductions in connection charges and fees by as much as fifty
495
percent. Furthermore, the enthusiasm of investors in the United
States, who have the capital and practical experience necessary to
grow Internet portals and network businesses, has contributed to
496
Argentina’s rapid development in this area.
The fact, however, that much e-commerce traffic in Latin America
would still be managed “offshore” in the United States and Europe
raises some question as to Latin America’s ability to control its own
destiny in cyberspace, particularly when so much of the private
investment capital comes from investors in the United States anxious
to make fortunes at the same break-neck speed that occurred with
497
the Internet revolution in the United States.
“Research firms like
International Data Corp. and Forrester Research forecast Latin
American Internet advertising revenues to grow to $645 million by
2003 from just $20 million in 1998. E-commerce transactions should
498
rise to $8 billion in 2003 from $170 million in 1998.”
The rapid growth in venture financing raises some concern about
overvaluing Internet companies, concerns many have raised in the
months since American dot-com companies began sliding on the
499
Nasdaq. Noted one investment banker, “[t]here is so much money
chasing deals that it is getting dangerous . . . [t]hey are pushing up
500
the value of companies that are not ready to receive money.” Add
to this that Latin American investors do not share the same sense of
501
risk taking American investors have grown used to over the years.

articles/990623-4.shtml (finding that El Sitio’s success in obtaining financing is
noted as “one of the larges first-round private equity placements in the e-commerce
industry.”).
494. See Frank Alvarado, Telecos in Final Negotiations Over Downtown Miami Internet
Hub, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., June 12, 2000, at A1.
495. See Warn, supra note 100 (explaining that deregulation is working to change
both the real and perceived costs of going online).
496. See id. (indicating that Argentina has experienced a wave of Internet start-ups
in the past two years, with local entrepreneurs raising an enormous amount of capital
from U.S. investors).
497. See U.S. Investors, supra note 482 (suggesting that American investors believe
that Latin America is at the same stage as the U.S. Internet market was four years
ago, and they expect to see similar, if not faster, growth patterns).
498. Id.
499. See id. (admitting that several veteran investors are complaining that for Latin
America, valuations are rising too high).
500. Id.
501. See id. (indicating that the arrival of the Internet revolution and U.S.-style
venture capitalism is forcing local financiers in Latin America to reexamine their old
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“But venture capitalists in Latin America cannot match the
sophistication of U.S. investors used to backing loss-making Internet
companies. It is still anathema to most Latin investors to put money
into a six-month old company that may only start generating positive
502
cashflow five years down the road.”
Yet, many of the Latin American start-ups are viewed as relatively
safer “than putting money into existing businesses where suspect
accounting or contempt for minority investors are frequent
503
problems.”
Start-ups in Latin America “also tend to be headed by
enthusiastic U.S.-educated entrepreneurs comfortable with American
504
business methods.”
In an effort to remain competitive in the growing Internet business
terrain, Internet providers, portals, and e-commerce start-ups are also
looking for large investment capital to expand across borders into
other countries in Latin America where home grown competition is
505
Portal companies in Mexico and Brazil are
not yet on the move.
aggressively expanding into other Latin countries in order to hedge
506
local competition with less operating capital.
Latin American banks had been following venture capital growth
507
from the sidelines until just recently.
“Bradesco, Brazil’s biggest
bank, owns 20% of non-voting shares in Multicanal, a company that
508
will offer customers high-speed Internet access.” The bank plans to
509
offer other online financial services. A Spanish parent bank, BBV,
which owns many banks throughout Latin America, is in the process
510
of establishing regional Internet banking services.
Not to be left

prejudices against supporting risky new start-ups).
502. Id. Despite this lack of experience, Latin investors quickly are starting to
fund Internet companies. For example, Exxel, the leading Latin private equity
financier in Buenos Aires, funded Latin Stocks, an online Internet financial services
company which intends to trade regional stocks, bonds, and mutual funds. See id.
503. U.S. Investors, supra note 485 (observing further that start-ups are more
attractive than existing businesses because they are less likely to have unpaid tax or
social security bills).
504. Id. (articulating that the relatively small sums committed to the region and
big returns seem to make these investments irresistible).
505. See id. (quoting representatives from Eversystems, a company providing
Internet-based financial software for banks and brokerages, as suggesting that
although the company does not need outside money to finance itself, investment
capital is required to expand).
506. See id. (determining that strong companies with a Nasdaq listing should be
able to use their stock to buy weaker competitors once the expected consolidation
phase sets in).
507. See U.S. Investors, supra note 482 (reiterating that some of Latin America’s
biggest banks are beginning to invest in cyberspace).
508. Id.
509. See id. (detailing that the bank soon will have a proprietary Internet service
provider offering free access plus shopping sites).
510. See id. (admitting that although the banks are taking an interest in the
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out, in December 1999, “Banamex, Mexico’s biggest bank,
announced a joint venture with the U.S.’s Commerce One to set up a
business-to-business, web-based marketplace for Latin America that
they plan to take public. Market reaction was immediate: Banamex’s
market capitalization rose by almost $900 million the day it made the
511
announcement.”
In Argentina, the media, advertising and public relations industries
are sophisticated and international in reach, with a large pool of
512
talent from which to draw.
“The penetration of cable television,
providing a potential alternative platform for Internet access, is the
highest in the world outside North America at 60 per cent of
513
households.”
Likewise, Telefónica, has teamed up with the state government of
São Paulo to provide high-speed Internet connections to thousands
514
of schools by December 2001.
The joint venture with the
government confirms the Brazilian government’s commitment to
social and commercial development, and is viewed officially as an
important step in the process of democratizing the Internet.
There is another side to the potential of e-commerce in the
region—the opportunity to be a catalyst for social equality and new
prosperity for small businesses, ethnic minorities reliant on
indigenous enterprise such as folk art and tourism, and small farmers
seeking direct access to global markets. The Dominican Republic is
moving in this direction with the help of funding from international
515
investors, particularly from Japan.
Presently, the Fernandez
administration is hoping to link isolated farming communities via the
516
Internet through a project called Intelligent Communities.
The
goal is to establish Internet centers “in order to help campesinos
transcend the communication barriers imposed by isolation, and give
them access [to] technological information about crop planting and
517
harvesting.”

Internet, few seem keen to support the new generation of Latin entrepreneurs).
511. Id.
512. See generally Warn, supra note 100 (outlining the advantages Argentina boasts
as an ideal location for Internet start-ups, including the high literacy rates, skilled
labor, and a technical infrastructure).
513. Id.
514. See Telefonica to Invest R$300m in Infrastructure, GAZETA MERCANTIL INVEST
NEWS, May 29, 2000.
515. See Global News Analysis, supra note 149 (noting the Dominican president’s
desire “to harness the twin forces” of globalization and the communications
revolution to boost his country’s economy).
516. See id. (adding that the technology was developed by the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology).
517. Id.
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CONCLUSION
No doubt, if the recent downturn in dot-com start-ups in the
United States is any indication, there will be a shaking out period
where struggling Latin American e-commerce ventures cannot
survive the push by the major Internet companies into the region.
Many e-commerce enterprises are in place and ready to do business,
but cannot move forward at the rate desired until the telecom
infrastructure, international taxation and tariff regulations, internal
laws regulating commercial transactions online, and changes in
consumer capabilities (more personal computers, more cost effective
518
access, changes in how Latin America shops) are in place.
It
remains to be seen if the realities of Latin America will meet and
exceed the expectations and forecasts of industry experts.
E-commerce executives with an eye on Latin America need to keep
in mind that the “tropicalization” of foreign models for development
and regulation do not necessarily promise success in the region.
Each Latin American country must address its own unique cultural
and economic particularities. Successful e-businesses take a holistic
view of their business and a realistic view of the Internet, and in order
to remain competitive in the Latin American marketplace, eentrepreneurs must find ways to innovate and create new value for
somewhat skeptical or hesitant Latin customers.
Vision, leadership, courage and innovation are critical to a
519
successful e-business.
The first premise for Latin American ebusinesses to accept and work with is that the Internet is inherently
520
imperfect.
Hence, to succeed one must forget about perfection.
The road to success means changing the traditional structures and
expectations, while being prepared to address disruptions and
521
problems with fluidity and flexibility.
Latin American technocrats must embrace a dynamic business
522
structure grounded on the six “Cs:” commerce (the ability to
provide a reliable interface between suppliers and consumers);

518. See supra Parts II.B.1, III.B.2, III.D and accompanying notes.
519. See Lauren Bielski, E-Business Models Stress Putting the Customer First, ABA
BANKING J., July 2000, at 70 (voicing the views of Mary Pat McCarthy, co-author of
Digital Transformation, The Essentials of E-Business Leadership, that developing an ecommerce strategy requires the need for vision and the need to embrace
imprecision).
520. See id. (noting that businesses need to recognize that the Internet is
disruptive and that waiting for perfection will result in foregone opportunities).
521. See id. at 76 (noting that Internet ventures should be treated as a work in
progress that require experimentation and reworking of the model when necessary).
522. See id. (noting that the six c’s are important factors for consideration when
planning an Internet venture).
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content (using the technology to address accurately the needs and
interests of the end user); cost (making e-commerce financially viable
for businesses and affordable for consumers); community (knowing
the capabilities of the technology to address the needs of businesses
and consumers); and collaboration (the ability to form and retain
strategic alliances between investors, providers, and government
523
entities).
An important question to be considered in the face of this Internet
boom, however, is whether Latin America’s new generation of
entrepreneurs are really new visionaries or just a new form of the old
524
guard of corrupt, elite, and entrenched businessmen and oligarchs.
Latin America offers global competitive manufacturing facilities
and raw materials. Expanded geographic reach via online markets
can overcome the region’s significant geographical boundaries,
enlarge the Latin American marketplace, and create great
competition. But the path to greater prosperity through Internet
commerce in Latin America will be a perilous journey with many
delays, setbacks, and not a few casualties. The rewards, however, are
potentially epic in proportion for the process of democratization,
economic and social development, and personal and societal
enrichment.


523. See generally KEYUR PATEL & MARY MCCARTHY, DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION: THE
ESSENTIALS OF E-BUSINESS LEADERSHIP (2000), cited in Kathleen Doler, Review: EBusiness Primer, 26 ELEC. BUS. 126 (2000).
524. See Matt Moffett, A New Latin America Faces a Devil of Old Rampant Corruption,
WALL ST. J., July 1, 1996, at A1 (acknowledging that with the billions of dollars of
foreign investment flooding the region, the temptations for corruption are greater
than ever before).

